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THE Alv.IERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT AND
THE REPRODUCfiVE RIGHTS OF HIVINFECfED WO:MEN

Taunya Lovell Banks *
I.

Introduction

In passing the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 1
Congress acknowledged that discrimination in access to health care is a
continuing problem for individuals with disabilities? Thus, it is not
surprising that gaining and retaining access to health care is a major
concern of individuals infected with HN. Many AIDS activists hailed the
enactment of the ADA as a great step forward in remedying the problem
of health care access.3 Although HN infection is not specifically
mentioned as a covered disability in the text of the ADA, the legislative
history of the Act indicates that Congress considered people infected with
HIV among those protected groups covered by the statute.4 Some writers

*Jacob A. France Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. Special thanks to my
former colleague Professor Eugene Harrington who first urged me to write about mY/AIDS.
1. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. ill 1991)
(aiming to eliminate discrimination against individuals with disabilities).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (Supp. m 1991).
3. Michael Specter, On the Front lines of Medical Politics: Lobbies Emerge As Powerfol
Advocates of Consumer Health, WASH. PoST, Jan. 30, 1990, at Health 15 (noting that the passage
of the ADA was a great triumph for AIDS activists because it helps those with AIDS and IllY gain
access to treatment).
4. H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 51 (1990), reprinted in 1990
u.s.c.c.A.N. 303, 333.

It is not possible to include in the legislation a list of all the specific conditions, diseases
or infections that would constitute physical or mental impairments because of the
difficulty of ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list, particularly in light of the
fact that new disorders may develop in the future. The term includes, however, such
conditions, diseases and infections as: ••• infection with the Human Immunodeficiency
Virus ••••

!d. Case law also indicates that individuals with infectious or contagious diseases may be considered
disabled under an earlier antidiscrimination statute, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988 & Supp. ill 1991)). See,
e.g., School Bd. of Nassau County, Fla. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 289 (1987) ("We hold that a
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even assert that Title lll of the ADA creates a duty on private health care
providers to treat individuals infected with HIV.5 There is some question
about whether the ADA does in fact modify the common law to create a
duty on the part of private health care providers to treat individuals
infected with HIV in the absence of some prior contractual arrangements
between the parties.6 The Act, however, aims to eliminate the denial of
services to disabled individuals on the basis of their handicaps.7 As one
commentator noted, "the ADA goes a long way toward . . . ensuring that
providers do not unreasonably turn away or refer patients with
disabilities. " 8
Under Title ill of the ADA, 9 private persons or entities that operate
public accommodations cannot discriminate against disabled individuals. 10

person suffering from the contagious disease of tuberculosis can be a handicapped person within the
meaning of§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 •••• "). Although not specifically mentioned
in the original Act or the Arline decision, it is now well established that persons infected with HIV
may be considered disabled under the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No.
CV 87-2514, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXJS 8401, at "'32 (C.D. Col. July 7, 1988) (holding that a person
with HIV can make out a claim of being "treated as an individual with a handicap" under the
Rehabilitation Act); Doe v. Jamaica Hospital, Kings County, Supreme Court, 205 N.Y. L.J. 27
(1991) (describing a case where an HN-infected woman filed a claim against a physician and a
hospital under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act for discrimination based on her HIV status).
5. See, e.g., Jill Cohen, Access to Medical Care for HW-Infected IndMduals Under tire
Americans with Disabilities Act: A Duty to Treat, 18 AM. J.L. & MED. 233, 239-42 (1992) (relying
on congressional intent as indicated in the legislative history). But see Lawrence 0. Goslin, 7he
Americans With Disabilities Act And 7he U.S. Health System, 11 HEALTH AFF. 248, 251 (1992)
(noting that, under the ADA, physicians may evade their duty of care under the guise of clinicol
judgment).
6. See Goslin, supra note 5, at 250 (stating that, although the ADA does not completely answer
the question of whether physicians owe a duty to treat, it attempts to clarifY the duty to treat).
7. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (Supp. m 1991) (finding that diseriminationagainst disabled persons
persists in health services and stating that the purpose of the Act is to eliminate discrimination against
individuals with disabilities).
8. Goslin, supra note 5, at 250.
9. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12181-12189 (Supp. m 1991) (containing provisions related to public
accommodations operated by private entities).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (Supp. m 1991) (defining when private entities ore considered
public accommodations); 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (Supp. m 1991) (stating the general prohibition of
discrimination on the basis of disability by places of public accommodation). In this Article, I focus
on private health care providers. Public health care providers are covered under Title n of the
ADA. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131-12165 (Supp. m 1991). TheRehabilitationAct of1973 is more limited
than the ADA. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355 (codified as amended
at 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796i (1988 & Supp. m 1991)). It prohibits discrimination against individuols
with disabilities by federal entities and recipients of federal funds. Rehabilitation Act§ 504, 87 Stat.
at 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1988 & Supp. m 1991)). Section 504 applies to
the recipients of federal funds and covers all health care providers who accept Medicare and
Medicaid patients, but the section does not expressly include all private medico] offices. See 29
U.S.C. § 794(b)(3)(A)(ii) (1988 & Supp. m 1991) (specifYing that private organizations that provide
health care ore subject to the Rehabilitation Act if they receive federal financiol assistance); 45
C.F.R. § 84.3 app. A at 376 (1992) (noting that health care providers who receive Medicaid as
HeinOnline -- 3 Tex. J. Women & L.
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As defined in the Act, public accommodations include hospitals and
professional offices of health care providers.11 Professional offices of
private sector health care providers may be considered places of public
accommodation under the ADA, even if the offices are located in private
homes. 12 The ADA also prohibits discrimination on the basis of
disability in the full and equal enjoyment of goods, services, facilities,
privileges, advantages, and accommodations of any place of public
accommodation. 13
In addition, the ADA prohibits a public
accommodation from providing different or separate benefits to persons
with disabilities unless a separate benefit is necessary to ensure access or
service that is as effective as those granted to individuals without a
disability. 14
To date, the bulk of early lawsuits filed under the ADA on behalf of
individuals infected with HIV involved situations where the plaintiffs were
refused treatment. 15 Gender has not been a significant factor in these
payment are "recipients" under the Rehabilitation Act and are subject to its provisions). Prior to
the ADA, some courts ruled that private medical and dental offices, clinics, hospitals, and
dispensaries are places of public accommodation, but these decisions were based on state or local
laws, not federal law. See, e.g., Hurwitz v. N.Y.C. Comm'n on Human Rights, 535 N.Y.S.2d
1007 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (upholding the jurisdiction of the New York City Commission on Human
Rights to declare that private dental offices are places of "public accommodation" within the
meaning of Human Rights Law); Plaintifrs Complaint for Damages and Injunctive Relief at 7-8,
Walsh v. Cicmanec, 1989 AIDS Litig. Rep. (Andrews Pub.) 2400 (Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. Jan.
1, 1989) (categorizing a chiropractic office as a place of public accommodation for purposes of
claiming California Civil Code violation through allegations that the chiropractor refused service to
the patient because he suffered from AIDS); cf. John O'Brien, AIDS Bias Claim Upheld Against
Doctor, 203 N.Y. LJ. 2 (1990) (describing the ruling in Elstein v. State Div. of Human Rights,
which held that the Human Rights Division did have jurisdiction to decide a claim of bias against
an AIDS patient by a private doctor).
11. See 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (Supp. ill 1991) (listing "professional office of a health care
provider, hospital or other service establishment" among those private entities considered "public
accommodations"); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1992) (defining places of public accommodation identically
to 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F)). In this Article, the term "health care provider" includes individual
health care workers and the institutions (e.g., hospitals and nursing homes) and organizations (e.g.,
Health Maintenance Organizations and Preferred Provider Organizations) with which they are
affiliated.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 12181(7)(F) (Supp. ill 1991); 28 C.F.R. § 36.104 (1992); Nondiscrimination
on the Basis of Disability by Public Accommodations and in Commercial Facilities, 56 Fed. Reg.
35,544 (1991) (codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 36) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis of a disability
by private entities in places of public accommodation and requiring new places of public
accommodation to be mode readily usable by persons with disabilities). The only exceptions are
facilities that are owned or operated by religious entities, private clubs, or establishments exempted
under Title U of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (Supp. ill 1991); 28 C.F.R. §
36.102(e) (1992).
13. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a) (Supp. ill 1991); 28 C.F.R. § 36.201(a) (1992). Section36.201 also
prohibits unequal services or the exclusion of persons with disabilities on the basis of disability for
reasons other than those specifically set forth in the statute. 28 C.F.R. § 36.201 (1992).
14. 42 u.s.c. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. m 1991).
15. See, e.g., ADA Health Care: Fuentes v. Reich, 1992 AIDS Litig. Rep. (Andrews Pub.)
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cases. 16 However, women infected with HIV have special medical
problems that distinguish them from men, stemming primarily from the fact
that the virus can be transmitted perinatally from mother to child. 17 It
is important to address these problems because of the growing number of
women with AIDS. AIDS became the sixth leading cause of death among
all women between the ages of twenty-five and forty-four in 1989. 18
Currently, women account for ten percent of all reported cases of AIDS in
the United States, and the number of women with AIDS is increasing. 19
To date, approximately eighty-five percent of the AIDS cases reported in
women occurred in women of childbearing age.20 These percentages do
not reflect the number of women who are infected with HIV but do not
have AIDS.21
Another important factor to consider in discussing the unique concerns
surrounding women with HIVIAIDS is the demographics of HIV-infected
women. The vast majority of women believed to be infected with HIV
come from poor urban communities of color.22 More specifically,

7917 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 1992) (commenting on a case in which a health care center allegedly
refused to see a patient because he was mY-positive); Americlll\8 with Disabilities Act: Charon v.
Hull, 1993 AIDS Litig. Rep. (Andrews Pub.) 9303 (N.D. Ohio Jan. 12, 1993) (describing a suit in
which the plaintiff claimed that 11 hospital refused him emergency room care 11fier finding out that
he was mY-positive); ADA Health Care: Toney v. U.S. Healthcare, 1992 AIDS Litig. Rep.
(Andrews Pub.) 7919 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 10, 1992) (describing a case in which it was alleged that 11
primary care physician refused to continue to treat a patient after the patient tested positive for HIV);
Americans with Disabilities: Totten v. Castle Dental Center, 1993 AIDS Litig. Rep. (Andrews Pub.)
9852 (I'ex. Dist. Ct. Apr. 27, 1993) (summarizing 11 suit against a dental center that refused to
provide further dental work to a patient after learning he was mY-positive).
16. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. These cases involved only men.
17. See A.B. Ades et al. (European Collaborative Study), Children Born to Women with HIV-1
Infection: Natural History and Risk of Transmission, 337 LANCET 253, 258 (1991) (reporting 11
12.9% perinatal transmission rate from mother to child).
18. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Mortality Patterns-United States,l989, 41
MORBIDllY & MORTAUlY WKLY. REP. 121, 124 (1989).
19. David Michaels & Carol Levine, Estimates ofthe Number ofMotherless Youth Otphaned
by AIDS in the United States, 268 JAMA 3456, 3456 (1992) (noting that from 1981 to March 1992
women accounted for 10% of the 218,301 cases of AIDS reported to the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, and noting that, upon closer examination of these figures, women comprised 9% of
the first 100,000 reported AIDS cases and 12% of the second 100,000 cases).
20. See Division for mY/AIDS, Center for Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention, AIDS in Women-United States, 265 JAMA 23, 23 (1991) [hereinafter Division for
mY/AIDS] (defining childbearing age as between the ages of 15 and 44).
21. Estimates indicate that approximately 80,000 women in the United States may be infected
with IDV. Marta Gwinn et al., Prevalence of HIV Jnftction in Childbearing Women in the United
States: Surveillance Using Newborn Blood Samples, 265 JAMA 1704, 1706 (1991).
22. See Carol Levine & Nancy Neveloff Dubler, Uncertain Risks and Biller Realities: 7he
Reproductive Choices of HIV-lnftcted Women, 68 MILBANK Q. 321, 324-27 (1990) (noting the
disproportionate impact that AIDS has on minorities and the poor); Michaels & Levine, supra note
19, at 3459 (identifYing the following cities with large numbers of reported AIDS cases among
women of childbearing age: New York (5,357), Newark (1,271), Miami (924), San Juan (674), Los
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approximately seventy percent of women with AIDS in the United States
are African-American or Hispanic.23 Roughly one-half of these women
have histories of intravenous drug use, and another quarter were infected
as a result of heterosexual contact with infected drug users.24
The demographics of women with AIDS and women infected with
HIV in the United States, along with the sources of their infection, may
account for the lack of public sympathy for them.25 As a class, women
with HIV and AIDS are seen as irresponsible women whose voluntary
conduct is responsible for their condition and as inappropriate parents
because of their drug use or association with drug users. Their association
with drug use, coupled with the historical antagonism toward childbearing
by poor women, especially women of color and women with
disabilities,26 only reinforces public sentiment in favor of limiting the
reproductive freedom of these women. 27
As a result of these
considerations and because most infected women are of childbearing age,
the public health and medical communities have focused much attention on

Angeles (354), and Washington, D.C. (254)). HIV/AIDS-related causes are the leading cause of
death among African-American women between the ages of 15 and 44 in the states of New York and
New Jersey. Susan Y. Chu et al., Impact of the Human Immunodeficiency Virns Epidemz·c on
Mortality in Women ofReproduct~ve Age, United States, 264 JAMA 225, 226 (1990). For example,
"the 1988 death rate for HIV/AIDS in black women 15 to 44 years of age was nine times the rate
for white women the same age." Id. at 227. Thus, it is not surprising that the number of children
whose mothers have died from AIDS are concentrated in cities like New York City, Newark,
Miami, San Juan, Los Angeles, and the District of Columbia. Michaels & Levine, supra note 19,
at 3459; see also U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS & STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION,
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, 1990 CP-1-18, 1990 CENSUS POPULATION-GENERAL POPULATION
CHARACTERISTics-METROPOUTAN AREAS § 1 (1990) (revealing that the percentage of minorities
in some of the major U.S. cities ranges from 11.7% in Miami Beach to 70.4% in Washington,
D.C.).
23. Working Group on HIV Testing of Pregnant Women and Newborns, HIV Injection,
Pregnant Women, and Newborns: A Policy Proposal for Infonnation and Testing, 264 JAMA 2416,
2416 (1990) (citing CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREvENTION, HIV/AIDS SURVEillANCE
REPORT, Aug. 1990, at 10); see Division for HIV/AIDS, supra note20, at23 ("Although black and
Hispanic women constitute 19% of all U.S. women, they represent 72% of all U.S. women
diagnosed with AIDS.").
24. Michaels & Levine, supra note 19, at 3456.
25. See, e.g., Kim Painter, Guilt, Innocence and AIDS, USA TODAY, Dec. 18, 1991, at 1D
(noting how the public makes distinctions between the "innocent victims" of AIDS with whom it
sympathizes, such as hemophiliacs, blood recipients, and babies, and those who engaged in "wrong
behavior" and became infected, such as drug users or individuals who had unprotected sex).
26. See infra Part ll.A.-B.
27. See, e.g., John D. Arras, AIDS and Reproductive Decisions: Having Children in Fear and
Trembling, 68 MILBANK Q. 353, 370-71 (1990) (arguing that it is "seriously irresponsible and
wrong" for a woman infected with HIV to bear a child when she is homeless, drug-addicted, without
family support, and in poor health); Judith Grad, Ethics and AIDS, in HIV Posmva: PERSPECTIVES
ON COUNSELING 37, 39 (Margot Tallmer et al. eds., 1991) ("Some people believe, as I do, that it
is morally wrong to risk bearing a child who has so high a likelihood of living a short life that will
end in excruciating pain.").
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minimizing the risk of maternal-fetal transmission of the virus. 28
In 1985, the increased incidence of perinatally transmitted HIV and
AIDS cases caused the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)
to recommend that women infected with HIV delay or forego bearing
children-a recommendation seconded by the American College of
Obstetrics and Gynecology (ACOG) in 1987.29 Many health care
providers adopted these recommendations and currently counsel HIVpositive women not to have children.30 Some commentators note that this

28. See infra note 29 and accompanying text (discussing the various responses of the medical
community to the issue of reproductive choices for HIV-infected women). See generally Nancy B.
Kass, Reproductive Decision Making in the Context ofHW: 7he Case for Nondirective Collnseling,
in AIDS, WOMEN, AND THE NEXT GENERATION 308 (Ruth R. Faden et al. eds., 1991) (discussing
counseling of HIV-positive women about their reproductive options and criticizing physicians who
voice their unsolicited professional opinions regarding the wisdom of certain choices when they tu'O
giving information).
29. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommendations for Assisting in the

Prevention of Perinatal Transmission of Human T-Lymphotropic Virns Type 111/LymphadenopathyAssociated Virns and Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome, 34 MORBIDI1Y & MORTAUTY' WKLY.
REP. 721, 725 (1985) [hereinafter CDC, Recommendations]; see Human Immune Deficiency Virns
Infections, ACOG TEcHNICAL BUlL. (Am. C. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists), Dec. 1988, at 5
(recommending that obstetricians and gynecologists should discourage HIV-positive women from
becoming pregnant). The most recent statement by ACOG regarding the care of pregnant women
infected with HIV was issued in June of 1992. This statement, however, did not address the issue
of the HIV-infected woman who is not pregnant but who is seeking counseling about future
pregnancies. Human Immunodeficiency Virns Infections, ACOG TECHNICAL BUlL. (Am. C. of
Obstetricians & Gynecologists), June 1992, at 3-4. A joint publication of the American Academy
of Pediatrics and ACOG contains a statement on HIV infection which stoles:
The identification of an HIV-infected pregnant woman as early in pregnancy as possible
is important to ensure appropriate counseling and medical core, including pregnancy
termination if this is her choice; to plan medical care for the infant; and to provide
counseling about family planning, future pregnancies, and the risk of sexual
transmission of HIV to others.
AMERICAN ACADEMY OF PEDIATRICS AND AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICIANS AND
GYNECOLOGISTS, GUJDEUNES FOR PERINATAL CARE 126 (Roger Freeman & Ronald Poland eds.,
3d ed. 1992). This book also does not address the issue of the HIV-infected woman who is not
pregnant and seeks counseling about future pregnancies.
In contrast to the CDC and ACOG positions, the introduction to the American Public Health
Association's policy statement #8814 addressing HIV infection reads: "the Association has
consistently affirmed the right of women to make their own reproductive choices and ocknowled["ges]
that any attempt to force or pressure o woman to undergo a sterilization procedure against har will
is contrary to Association policy •••• " American Public Health Association, Counseling and
Testing for Perinatal Transmission of AIDS, 19 AM. J. Pua. HEALTH 359, 359 (1989).
30. "State, and some local, health departments hove in a variety of ways adopted the substance
of the CDC's recommendations on vertical HIV transmission as their own. • • • [T)he goal of
preventing the birth of infected babies has been explicitly embraced by public health officials."
Ronald Bayer, AIDS and the F11ture ofReproductive Freedom, 68 MILBANK Q. 179, 191 (Supp. 2
1990). The CDC had recommended: "Women with virologic or serologic evidence of [HIV] should
be counselled regarding their own risk of AIDS and the risk of perinatal and sexual transmission •
• • • Infected women should be advised to consider delaying pregnancy until more is known about
perinatal transmission of the virns." CDC, Recommendations, supra note 29, at 725 (emphasis
HeinOnline -- 3 Tex. J. Women & L.
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type of counseling represents a departure from the traditional nondirective
reproductive counseling paradigm developed in the context of counseling
women about genetic risk. 31 Some of these commentators also speculate
that the race and socioeconomic status of the women disproportionately
affected by HIV influenced this shift in the counseling paradigm.32
These criticisms make it important to determine whether there is
sufficient medical evidence to support counseling women with HIV to
forego childbearing. The reality is, however, that current medical
knowledge does not mandate the CDC directive. For instance, the limited
medical knowledge currently available about pregnancy in HIV-infected
women does not reveal a proven direct correlation between pregnancy and
accelerated progression of the disease in women.33 Moreover, the rate
of maternal-fetal transmission of HIV in the United States is no more than
thirty-six percent and is possibly as low as thirteen percent.34
added). Ronald Bayer argues that, despite the fact that the CDC did not strongly encourage women
not to become pregnant, there can be no doubt about "how the CDC believed women ought to act
in the face ofHIV infection." Bayer, supra, at 191. As a result of this, "[i]n many cases, health
departments have ignored the subtle equivocation in the CDC's phrasing and have declared: 'We
follow the recommendations of the CDC and urge women not to become pregnant.'" ld. at 192.
31. See, e.g., Taunya L. Banks, Women and AIDS: Racism, Sexism and Classism, 17 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 351, 373-76 (1989-90) (noting that a nondirective counselor only counsels
the family about genetic risks and has no right to advise against having a child even when the risk
of transmitting a serious genetic defect or HIV is great); Levine & Dubler, supra note 22, at 345-46
(noting that prospective parents of children with other inheritable diseases are not counseled in the
same way as prospective parents with HIV). See generally Bayer, supra note 30, at 179-204
(discussing counseling choices and procreative rights).
32. See, e.g., Banks, supra note 31, at 361-65 (noting a long history of racist medical policy
in the United States); Bayer, supra note 30, at 182 ("That the women who are most at risk for
bearing infected children are poor, black and Hispanic, and most often intravenous drug users or
their sexual partners, heightens the sense of disquiet about the prospect of a repressive tum in public
policy.") (citation omitted); see also Levine & Dubler, supra note 22, at 337-39 (discussing how
middle-class America has aimed to control the reproductive decision making of poor women of color
and mentally disabled women). To date, the vast majority of women infected with HIV are AfricanAmerican or Hispanic. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
33. Some studies conclude that for an asymptomatic woman with HIV, pregnancy poses no
additional risk. See Marie-Louise Newell et al., HW-1 Infection in Pregnancy: Implications for
Women and Children, 4 AIDS Sill, S112 (Supp. 1 1990) (noting that more recent studies do not
indicate differences in the progression of HIV between pregnant and nonpregnant HIV-positive
women); Peter A. Selwyn et al., Prospective Study ofHuman Immunodeficiency Virns Infection and
Pregnancy Outcomes in Intravenous Drug Users, 261 JAMA 1289, 1293 (1989) (reporting that for
seropositive women, the rates of antenatal medical and obstetric complications were no different than
for seronegative women and noting that none of the seropositive women developed AIDS either
during their pregnancies or after a thirteen month postpartum follow-up). Although the "knowledge
concerning the impact of pregnancy on the course ofHIV disease is ••• meag[er] and conflicting,"
there is also evideQce that pregnancy may accelerate the course of HIV disease. Susanne Lindgren
et al., HIV and Child-Bearing: Clinical Outcome and Aspects of Mother-to-Infant Transmission, 5
AIDS 1111, 1111 (1991).
34. Michaels & Levine, supra note 19, at 3459; see also Ades et al., supra note 17, at 258
(finding a 12.9% transmission rate in a June 1990 European study of 372 children who were 18
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There is also inadequate information about how the virus is transmitted
from mother to fetus, and "there is no safe and effective technique for the
fetal diagnosis of HIV infection. "35 In contrast to the CDC, one group
of researchers has concluded that health care providers should counsel
"women with clinical or immunological evidence of HIV illness . . . that
transmission to the infant may occur."36 This recommendation varies
significantly from CDC's recommendation that HIV-infected women delay
or forego pregnancy.
In this Article, I argue that, under the ADA, directive reproductive
counseling ofHIV-positive women not to bear children constitutes separate,
different, unequal, and less effective medical treatment and services based
on their physical disability. Specifically, any reproductive counseling
policy for HIV-positive women based solely on their seropositive status
constitutes separate, different, unequal, and less effective counseling than
that received by able-bodied women making reproductive choices. I also
argue that any blanket policy of refusing to provide reproductive-related
services, including abortion and infertility services, constitutes separate,
different, unequal, and less effective medical treatment based on a
protected physical disability in violation of the ADA.
In Part II of this Article, I argue that the failure of HIV-infected
women to receive equal and effective medical treatment and services from
health care providers in reproductive matters is a continuing problem for
most women with disabilities and that the problem is exacerbated by the
fact that women disabled by HIV infection tend to be poor and women of
color. I explore the history of governmental and medical interference with
the reproductive decisions of low income, minority, and disabled women.
I then discuss how the constitutional protection of the right of these women
to procreate is ambiguous and insufficient.
In Part m of this Article, I argue that health care providers' decisions
on reproductive matters must be scrutinized more closely because they

months or older); Laura Boylan & Zena A. Stein, The Epidemiology of HIV Infection in Children
and Their Mothers-Vertical Transmission, 13 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVs. 143, 155-68 (1991) (discussing
various studies that have been conducted to determine the vertical transmission rate of HIV from
mother to child); Jody W. Zylke, Another Consequence of Uncontrolled Spread of HIV Among
Adults: Vertical Transmission, 265 JAMA 1798, 1798 (1991) (reporting that studies revealed that
transmission rates vary from 10% to SO%, but the most likely rate ranges from 25% to 35%).
35. Marsha F. Goldsmith, Specific HIV-Related Problems of Women Gain More Attention at
a Price-Affecting More Women, 268JAMA 1814, 1814-15 (1992). For example, at least one study
found that "race, age, gravidity, history of sexually transmitted diseases and/or the use of injected
drugs or crack cocaine, anemia and detectable p24 antigen were not directly associated with
transmission. Neither was theCD4 count." ld. at 1815. Another study suggested that the mother's
strain of lHV may determine whether a child is born with lHV. Id.
36. See id. (discussing a study of 129 IDV-infected women conducted by Dr. Pauline Thomas
and her colleagues in the New York City Perinatal lHV Transmission Collaborative Study Group).
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often reflect nonmedical, moral judgments about parental fitness that are
influenced by the disability and by the race and socioeconomic status of the
patient. I also assert that health care providers may have difficulty
avoiding making decisions on nonmedical bases because they have
conflicting professional obligations growing out of the two-patient obstetric
model that views both the pregnant woman and the fetus as patients.37
As a result, the desires of women infected with HN may be subordinated
to the health care provider's biased judgment about the quality of life of
any potential offspring.
In Part N of this Article, I argue that, under the ADA, nonmedical
considerations distort health care providers' assessment of available medical
information and undercut the right of HN-positive women to make
voluntary, fully informed choices about whether or not to bear children and
to obtain the medical assistance they need to realize their choices. These
so-called "medical" decisions violate at least the spirit of the ADA because
they impermissibly interfere with the reproductive freedom of women with
a protected disability. In each instance where the health care provider's
decision to counsel a woman not to become pregnant or to exclude her
from infertility services is influenced by the woman's physical disability,
the decision is suspect.
In Part V, I conclude that most courts handling ADA claims will be
unduly deferential to these so-called objective medical opinions on
reproductive matters and will narrowly interpret the statute's provisions.
Therefore, it may be difficult to successfully pursue HN-related
reproductive claims unless Congress amends the ADA to clearly indicate
that discrimination in reproductive matters against women with protected
disabilities violates the Act. Otherwise, many disabled women, especially
women infected with HIV, will continue to receive different and unequal
reproductive-related treatment and services.
In setting out these arguments, I do not raise any questions about basic
37. See infra notes 110-117 and accompanying text. Increasingly, advances in perinatal
technology result in cases where maternal and fetal needs come into conflict over the treatment of
the fetus in utero. See Veronika E.B. Kelder et al., Ccurt-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1192, I 194 (1987) (describing cases in which court orders have been sought to
override maternal refusal for fetal therapy or surgery in the interests of the "second patient," the
fetus). When maternal and fetal needs are in conflict, some physicians view the fetus as a separate
patient and believe that high-tech fetal interventions are appropriate even over the objections of the
pregnant woman. See Lisa C. Ikemoto, 7he Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection ofthe
Ideology of Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Sdence, and the Interventionist Mindset of
lAw, 53 OHIO ST. LJ. 1205, 1236-40 (1992) (discussing physicians' attempts to override pregnant
mothers' objections to new experimental fetal therapies when the physicians disagree with the
mothers' choices). Feminists argue that this view of the maternal-fetal relationship undercuts
women's autonomy during pregnancy. ld. at 1294-95 (suggesting that, once one rejects the
assumption that fetal interests should trump those of the pregnant mother, one is left with a strong
presumption that the mother's autonomy interests are too important to override).
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access to health care. Rather, I am assuming that the health care provider
has voluntarily undertaken the care of a woman who is infected with HIV
and that the provider is trained and experienced in obstetrics and
gynecology. The primary questions I address are the extent to which the
ADA prohibits health care providers from controlling, through directive
counseling or by refusing to provide abortion or infertilicy services, the
procreational choices of women with disabilities and specifically women
with HIV.
IT. History of Discrimination

A. Low-Income Women and Women of Color
Historically, women in the United States have had little control over
their ability to procreate.38 Effective contraception was unavailable until
the twentieth century.39 Some states even criminalized contraceptive use
and counseling until the early 1970s.40 However, with the introduction
of the birth control pill in the late 1960s and the recognition in 1973 of a
right to privacy encompassing the decision to have an abortion,41 women
in this country began to have real control in reproductive matters.
Nevertheless, certain groups of women traditionally have had less control
over reproductive decision making than others. For example, there is a
well-documented history of sterilization abuse directed against women of
color in the United States.42 Federal and state governments were active
participants in this abuse. In fact, the last widely reported case of
government-supported involuntary sterilization occurred in the early 1970s
38. See Ikemoto, supra note 37, at 1222-25 (1992) (discussing historical and legislative
restrictions on a woman's decision to reproduce).
39. See JAMES REED, FROM PRIVATE VICE TO PliBUC VIRTUE: THE BIRTH CONTROL
MOVEMENT AND AMERICAN SOCIETY SINCE 1830 5-6 (1978) (noting that effective contraceptive
regimens were not available during the nineteenth century).
40. For example, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down n state law that prohibited the
distribution of contraceptives to married couples. Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The
Court subsequently struck down n similar provision that applied only to single persons. Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
41. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
42. See BETSY HARTMANN, REPRODUCTIVE RIGHTS AND WRONGS 240 (1987) (noting that poor
women and women of color are often given hysterectomies that are unnecessary, even though n
hysterectomy is a much more dangerous form of sterilization than is a tubal ligation). It nlso slJould
be noted that "[t]he United States has played a major role in the introduction of sterilization into
Third World family planning." /d. at 230. "The U.S. Agency for International Development (AID)
funds the Program for International Education in Gynecology and Obstetrics, which brings foreign
medical personnel to the United States to learn sterilization techniques, and the greater part of the
Association for Voluntary Sterilization's (AVS) international program budget of about $10 million."
/d. The initial concern of AVS was population control, and the organization was formerly linked
with the eugenics movement. /d.
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and involved two African-American sisters, Minnie Lee and Mary Alice
Relf, fourteen and twelve years old, who were sterilized using Federal
funds designed to help eliminate poverty.43 Much has been written about
the Relf sisters, other women of color subjected to involuntary
sterilizations, and the federal regulations promulgated after their
involuntary sterilizations were exposed.44
Government-sanctioned sterilization abuse of women of color
continues today despite federal regulations requiring informed consent and
a waiting period. 45 Even if these restrictions were effective in preventing
overt abuse of sterilization,46 the fact remains that "[c]lassism and racism
lead physicians and other health care providers to urge sterilization on
patients they believe incapable of using other methods effectively. " 47

43. Relf v. Weinberger, 372 F. Supp. 1196 (D.D.C. 1974). The court in this case
acknowledged that the Relf sisters' experience was not unusual and that there was "uncontroverted
evidence in the record that ••• an indefinite number of poor people have been improperly coerced
into accepting a sterilization operation under the threat that various federally supported welfare
benefits would be withdrawn unless they submitted to irreversible sterilization." !d. at 1199.
44. See DANIEL J. KEvLE.s, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENEl'ICS AND THE UsES OF
HUMAN HEREDITY 275-76 (1985) (highlighting the Relf sisters' case and describing how the
subsequent requirement of informed consent was ignored as it concerned minority women); Andrea
Asaro, 7he Judicial Portrayal ofthe Physician in Abortion and Sterilization Decisions: 7he Use and
Abuse of Medical Discretion, 6 HARv. WoMEN'S LJ. 51, 93-101 (1983) (discussing the abuse of
medical discretion in the sterilization of women); Adele Clarke, Subtle Fonns ofSterilization Abuse:
A Reproductive Rights Analysis, in TEsT-TuBE WoMEN: WHAT FuTuRE FOR MoTHERHOOD 188,
191-202 (Rita Arditti et nl. eds., 1984) (discussing both blatant and more subtle types of sterilization
abuse and their effects on poor women and women of color); Laurie Nsiah-Jefferson, Reproductive
Laws, Women ofColor, and Low-Income Women, in REPRODUCfiVE LAws FOR THE 1990s 23, 45-49
(Sherrill Cohen & Nadine Taub eds., 1989) (noting that, although regulations to prevent unwarranted
sterilizations were adopted in the 1970s, there has been no evaluation of the effectiveness of these
regulations or the extent to which they have been followed); Dick Grosbol1, Note, Sterilization
Abuse: Otrrent State of the Law and Remedies for Abuse, 10 GoLDEN GATE U. WOMEN's L.F.
1147, 1153-56 (1980) (identifying cases in which poor women and women of color have utilized the
legal system after being coerced into sterilization).
45. 42 C.F.R. §§ 441.250-441.259 (1992); 42 C.F.R. §§ 50.201-50.210 (1992). Federal
regulations require that an individual give informed consent in writing before sterilization. 42
C.F.R. § 50.203(c). The individual must be fully informed of all possible risks, benefits, and
alternatives, and also must be afforded the opportunity to have all her questions regarding the
sterilization answered. 42 C.F.R. § 50.204. Federal regulations also mandate a waiting period of
30 to 180 days before the sterilization procedure is performed. 42 C.F.R. § S0.203(d); see Clarke,
supra note 44, at 192-202 (describing some of the more common types of subtle sterilization abuse
that currently occur).
46. The informed consent and waiting period restrictions are not very effective because there
are no criminal or civil sanctions imposed when they are violated. The only adverse consequence
of violating these regulations is loss of reimbursement for the sterilization. See 42 C.F.R. §
441.256(a) (1992) ·(requiring documentation of informed consent before receiving reimbursement
from Medicaid); 42 C.P.R. § 50.209 (1992) (requiring the use of a specific informed consent form
as a condition of funding).
47. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 44, at 47 (explaining that, for various reasons, poor women and
women of color are more likely to be coerced into sterilization procedures).
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This type of thinking may explain why government-financed sterilization
is readily available while abortion is not: 48 sterilization has a permanence
that abortion does not. 49 Some might even argue that sterilization of
poor and minority women is more cost-efficient than abortion because it is
done once, whereas abortion may be used repeatedly.
There is also a disturbing trend among medical authorities toward
seeking court-ordered obstetrical intervention to force women, most of
whom are women of color with low incomes, to have cesarean sections and
intrauterine transfusions.50 In addition, state courts have occasionally
ordered pregnant women who abused illicit drugs or alcohol, or who were
charged with child abuse or neglect, to use contraceptives.51 The states
48. See id. (noting that states that provide sterilization services through Medicaid programs are
reimbursed for 90% of the costs, but that many states do not provide abortion services through
Medicaid programs, and those that do will not be reimbursed by the federal government following
the enactment of the Hyde Amendment); see also Barbara Brotman, 71te Abortion Maze: Crazy Quilt
ofLaws Among States Likely to Get Even Wor.se, CHI. TRJB., Jan. 14, 1990, at Perspective 1 (noting
that thirty-seven states have passed laws forbidding the use of Medicaid funds for abortion in almost
all circumstances since 1977). The unavailability of less costly and more temporary means of
contraception may explain why African-American women currently have a higher abortion rate than
white women. See Gina Kolata, Studies Find Abortion is Common in All Race and Economic
Groups, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1988, at BIS (noting that young, poor, African-American, unmarried
women are most likely to have abortions). It seems that governmentsl policy in the United States
increasingly tends to encourage some groups of women to permanently forego pregnancy. See Susan
Sangree, Control of Childbearing by HIV-Positive Women: Some Responses to Emerging Legal
Policies, 41 BUFF. L. REv. 309, 323-26 (1993) (discussing post-eugenics, government-sanctioned
reproductive coercion). Another example of state governments' desire to restrict the reproductive
choices of some women is the willingness of state governments to pay for the surgical implantation
of Norplant into poor women, who are predominantly women of color. See id. at 333 n.89
(discussing proposed state legislation and policies).
49. In contrast, some women may see abortion as a better alternative than permanent
sterilization because abortion does not permanently foreclose a woman's ability to become pregnant,
whereas sterilization does. Thus, the choice of abortion over government-financed sterilization
suggests that many African-American women are not ready to permanently forego theirprocreotionnl
choice.
50. See Kolder et al., supra note 37, at 1195 (analyzing the results of a study that found that
pregnant women who were poor or who were women of color were more likely to be subjected to
a court-ordered procedure in cases where they refused medical aid to the fetus). The study found
that 81% of the women subjected to court-ordered obstetrical interventions were women of color,
44% were unmarried, and none were private patients. /d. at 1195. Other studies hove made similar
findings. See Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 44, at 63 n.80 (reporting that women of color had the
highest rates of cesarean sections). For a discussion and critique of this policy, see generally Janet
Gallagher,Fetus As Patient, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990s, supra note44, at185, 204-08
(pointing out that the burden of proof for court-ordered cesarean sections is much lower than is
required for other court-ordered medical treatments).
51. For example, Darlene Johnson, a 27 year-old pregnant African-American woman was
convicted of child abuse for beating two of her four children with an electrical cord after she found
them engaging in potentially harmful activities. Johnson v. Col., No. 29390 (Cal. App. Dep't
Super. Ct. plea entered Dec. 3, 1990). The state judge gave her the option of spending one year
in prison and three years on probation or four months in prison and three years on probation if she
agreed to use the contraceptive Norplant for three years. Matthew Rees, Shot in the Ann: 71te Use
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are divided over the constitutionality of such measures. 52 At least one
commentator suggests that courts increasingly are adopting a "code of
perfect pregnancy" that represents an ideology of motherhood, which
implicitly excludes certain women, and in doing so tend to "default" to
medical science in matters involving reproductive decision making by
women.53 This ideology of motherhood excludes poor women and
women of color.54 The practice of exclusion is often subtle. The biased
decision making of health care providers regarding the sterilization of poor
women and women of color is one example. These so-called medically
based decisions, which are reinforced by the courts, are a particularly
pernicious form of this practice.

B.

Women With Disabilities

Americans assume that disabled women of reproductive age will not
become mothers.55 Although a few women are disabled in ways that
limit their reproductive choices, the choices of most disabled women are
restricted for nonmedical reasons. These "women encounter substantial

and Abuse of Norplant, NEW REPUBUC, Dec. 9, 1991, at 16. In 1991, the state of Kansas
introduced legislation that would require the implantation of Norplant in fertile women convicted of
felony possession and distribution of certain illegal drugs. See z'd. (describing legislative efforts in
Kansas and other states). For criticism of this practice by the courts, see generally Dorothy E.
Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality, and the Right of
Privacy, 104 HAR.v. L. REv. 1419 (1991) (arguing against the prosecution of drug-addicted mothers
and advocating governmental policies that recognize a woman's autonomy in reproductive decisions).
52. See Sangree, supra note 48, at 311-12 n.6 (discussing several cases involving court-ordered
contraception which were invalidated because the court order was not reasonably related to the goal
of rehabilitation).
53. See lkemoto, supra note37, at 1216-21, 1287-95 (describing the historical view that certain
types of women, such as prostitutes, were unfit for motherhood and discussing the extent to which
medical technology now allows the fetus to be treated as a separate patient by the doctor).
54. See id. at 1231-33 (noting that poor women of color are much more likely to be sterilized
because many regard "excessive childbearing" by these women as undesirable and arguing that the
"ideal for motherhood" is constructed along race and class lines).
55. AdrienneAsch, Reproductive Technology and Disability, in REPRODUCI'IVB LAws FOR THB
1990s, supra note 44, at 69, 79; see also Donna Hyler, To Choose a Child, in WITH THB POWER
OF EAcH BREATH 280, 281-82 (Susan E. Browne et al. eds., 1985) (recounting the negative
reactions to the pregnancy of a woman with arthritis); JoAnn Le Maistre, Parenting, in WITH THB
POWER OF EACH BREATH 284, 285 (Susan E. Browne et al. eds., 1985) ("Parenthood is the hardest
job anyone will ever have. Yet, the physically limited parent may be the only parent ••• toward
whom the community directs its anxiety about the difficulty of the job."); Susan Shaul et al., Like
Other Women: Perspectives ofMothers with Physical Disabilities, in WOMEN AND DISABIUTY: THE
DOUBLE HANDICAP 133, 133-42 (Mar:y Jo Deegan & Nancy A. Brooks eds., 1985) (discussing
societal resistance to viewing women with disabilities as potential parents). See generally CHILDREN
OF HANDICAPPED PARENTS (S. Kenneth Thurman ed., 1985) (describing the presumption against
disabled parents' fitness to rear children).
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legal, medical, and familial resistance to their choice of motherhood. "56
Recent studies suggest that approximately two-thirds of all Americans view
a woman's physical disability as an acceptable reason for her to have an
abortion.57 This value-laden judgment about the propriety of women
with disabilities bearing children also applies to able-bodied women who
may give birth to children with disabilities. In fact, "implicit in many
reproductive technologies, and explicit in some, is the goal of preventing
future disability. "58 There is subtle and even overt pressure on users of
prenatal diagnosis to abort after detection of a disability.59
For example, several years ago Bree Walker Lampley, a successful
and attractive television anchor in Kansas City, was the subject of a heated
radio talk show program during which the show's host and callers
discussed whether the then pregnant Ms. Lampley should have become
pregnant since she has a rare genetic anomaly that she could have passed
on to her child. Ms. Lampley has ectrodactylism, a condition that causes
the hands and toes to be partially fused and to appear webbed. There was
a fifty percent chance that Ms. Lampley's child would inherit the anomaly,
and the host asked her listeners whether they thought it was fair to pass
along a genetically disfiguring disease to one's child. Callers expressed
extreme hostility towards Ms. Lampley and stated that they would prefer
not being alive to having a disease like ectrodactylism. One caller who had
partial color blindness remarked that it would have been "'hell' if he had
passed on his disability" to his child.60 This reaction demonstrates the
public view that a disability of either the mother or her potential offspring
forecloses the possibility of procreation. The reaction is even stronger for
women of color, given the history of antagonism toward their bearing even
able-bodied children.
I

C. Federal Constitutional Protection
The U.S. Constitution provides little protection for the reproductive
decisions of poor women, women of color, and women with disabilities.
The U.S. Supreme Court has addressed the right to procreate in only two
cases. In the first case, Buck v. Bell, the Court upheld the constitutionality

56. Asch, supra note 55, at 79.
57. See Mary Ann Lamanna, Soda! Sdence and Ethical Issues: 7he Policy Implications ofPoll
Data on Abortion, in ABORTION: UNDERSTANDING DIFFERENCES 1, 5 (Sidney Callahan & Daniel
Callahan eds., 1984) (reporting the results of a survey that found that 64% of the respondents did
not view abortion as morally wrong in situations where the mother was physically handicapped).
58. Asch, supra note 55, at 81.
59. Jd.
60. Jay Mathews, 7he Debate Over Her Baby: Bree Walker !Ampley Has a Dejonnity. Some
People 7hink She Shouldn't Have Kids, WASH. PosT, Oct. 20, 1991, at Fl.
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of a Virginia sterilization statute designed to prevent reproduction by
institutionalized "mentally defective people," ruling that the state statute
did not violate the substantive due process requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 61 In the second case, Skinner v. Oklahoma, the Supreme
Court relied on equal protection analysis to distinguish, rather than
overrule, Buck in striking down an Oklahoma statute authorizing the
The Court indicated that
sterilization of habitual criminals.62
procreational decision making is fundamental and noted that courts should
scrutinize state-initiated compulsory sterilization classifications strictly. 63
Although the Court did recognize the importance of procreational decision
making, it did not hold that the right to procreate is per se a fundamental
constitutional right worthy of absolute protection.64 The Court did not
elaborate on this point, but one can read Skinner to suggest that states can
authorize involuntary sterilization of habitual criminals provided they can
justify any discrepancies in treatment between different classes of
criminals. Since Skinner does not prohibit all state-authorized involuntary
sterilizations, it is conceivable that HN-infected women may be targeted
for involuntary sterilization in certain circumstances.
The most recent discussions by the Supreme Court concerning the
right to procreate occurred in the abortion cases, beginning with Roe v.
Wade65 and ending with Planned Parenthood of Southeastern

61. Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927).
62. The Court argued that, while Buck retied on the fact that all within the same class would
be treated equally, Skinner involved a situation where "the law lays an unequal hand on those who
have committed intrinsically the same quality of offense ••• [and thus} has made as invidious a
discrimination as if it had selected a particular race or nationality for oppressive treatment." Skinner
v. Okla., 316 U.S. 535, 540-41 (1942).
63. /d. at 541 ("We are dealing here with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights
of man. Marriage and procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.").
64. /d. Ultimately, the Court abandoned the fundamental rights analysis it used in Skinner in
a string of contraceptive cases involving state intrusions on procreative choices. In Griswold v.
Conneclicul, the Court struck down a state law criminalizing contraceptive use and counseling,
relying on a "zone of privacy," derived from various amendments to the Constitution, which
encompasses the marital relationship. 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965). In Eisenstadt v. Baird, the
Court extended this protection from state interference in procreational matters to single persons
when it struck down a statute that criminalized the distribution of contraceptives to single people but
allowed distribution to married persons. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). In Eisenstadt, however, the Court
refused to base its holding on a fundamental rights theory and retied instead on an even more
ambiguous privacy guarantee, which it held applied to individuals as well as to married couples as
a matter of equal protection. /d. at 453 (declining to state the scope of the privacy guarantee but
noting that "whatever the rights of the individual to access to contraceptives may be, the rights must
be the same for the unmarried and the married alike").
65. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). In Roe, the Court held thatthe state's interest in protecting the health
of the mother or the life of the fetus cannot prohibit a woman's access to abortion during the first
trimester of pregnancy. /d. at 164. Although the Court extended the right to privacy to encompass
a woman's decision to terminate a pregnancy in many circumstances, it nonetheless cited Buck to
support the claim that the right of privacy does not allow an individual "an unlimited right to do with
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Pennsylvania v. Casey. 66 In Casey, the Court reexamined the source of
the right to an abortion. A plurality of the Court reaffirmed the essential
holding of Roe that a woman has a right to have an abortion before
viability without "undue interference from the State. "67 The plurality
acknowledged that the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment Due
Process Clause encompasses areas of personal liberty, including decisions
relating to procreation. 68 The state has only a limited right to interfere
in these areas and can justify interference only where there is an
"important and legitimate interest in protecting the potentiality of human
life. " 69 The plurality in Casey also suggested, however, that the right to
procreate carries with it an obligation to be responsible in making
procreational decisions and asserted that it is this aspect of the right which
the Court attempted to protect in Roe.10 Thus, the right to procreate as
one's body as one pleases •••• " Id. at IS4. Nevertheless, the Court indicated that state regulations
limiting this right to bodily autonomy must be based on compelling interests and, while compelling,
must nonetheless be narrowly drawn. Id. at ISS.
66. 112 S. Ct. 279I (I992).
67. ld. at 2804.
68. See id. at 2807 (citing a number of cases, including C!ilrey v. PopulationServs. lnt'l, 43I
U.S. 678, 68S (I977) and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972)).
69. Id. at 28I7 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 4IO U.S. I I3, I62 (I973)).
70. The Court makes this point eloquently in Casey: "{These Supreme Court decisions) support
the reasoning in Roe relating to the woman's liberty because they involve personal decisions
concerning not only the meaning of procreation but also human responsibility and respect for it."
I I2 S. Ct. at 2807 (emphasis added) (discussing Griswold v. Connecticut, Eisenstadt v. Baird, and
Carey v. Population Servs. h1t'l). Although some people believe that each pregnancy is so
wonderful that it shoulp be continued regardless of any difficulties posed in caring for a child, the
Court noted that others argue that "the inability to provide for the nurture and care of the infant is
a cruelty to the child and an anguish to the parent." Id. at 2808.
Although Casey may have clarified certain issues surrounding the extent to which the
government may restrict women's access to abortion, it does not squarely address whether the
government may direct or coerce women not to bear children. In Casey, however, the plurality
justifies retaining the Roe rationale as necessary to protect both a woman's right to an abortion and
her "interest in deciding whether to bear and beget a child .•.• " Id. at 2811. The plurality also
suggests that, even if the Court overrules Roe, the cases relying on Roe that involve governmental
restrictions on the right to bear children would remain sound because the facts of Roe confine its
scope. See id. (discussing why errors in Roe would not seriously affect other types of cases
involving reproductive issues). In other words, Roe involves a woman's choice concerning "post·
conception potential life," whereas forced abortion or sterilization cases involve situations where the
government is sanctioning the destruction of potential life. Id. Even some of the dissenting justices
in Casey seem to agree with this distinction. For example, Chief Justice Rehnquist distinguishes
marriage, procreation, and contraception from abortion because the latter "'involves the purposeful
termination of [a] potential life.'" Id. at 2859 {Rehnquist, CJ., dissenting) (quoting Harris v.
McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 325 (1980)). Justice Scalia, also a dissenter in Casey, indicates that there
is a liberty interest in childbirth protected by the Constitution. Jd. at 2874 n.1 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
The plurality cites two lower court cases where governmental agencies tried to prohibit minor
women from bearing children to support the proposition that Roe has been relied upon to prevent
the state from forcing women to terminate pregnancies or to undergo sterilization. Id. at 2811. In
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protected by Roe arguably only extends to individuals who exercise it
"responsibly"-the problem, of course, is with who is defining
"responsibly" and how it is defined.
Other Supreme Court decisions focus on regulation of contraceptives
designed to prevent pregnancy rather than terminate it,71 but most of
these cases are linked to other so-called fundamental rights such as the
right to marry72 or rear children.73 Even in Skinner, the involuntary
sterilization case, the Court characterized the right to procreate as an
important component of the marital relationship. 74 As a result, the
parameters of any constitutional right to procreate are not entirely clear. 75
ill. Implications for HIV-Infected Women

In light of the continued acceptance of controls on the reproductive
choices of low-income women, women of color, and women with
disabilities, and in light of the ambiguous scope of the constitutional right
to procreate, it is not surprising that some government agencies and
medical associations recommend that health care providers direct women
infected with HIV not to bear children or to consider abortion if they are
already pregnant. It also is not surprising that many other people in this

Amold v. Board ofEducation ofEscambia County, Alabama, a federal appellate court used the Roe
rationale to conclude that a state government would violate the Constitution if it coerced a minor
woman to have an abortion. 880 F.2d 305, 311 (11th Cir. 1989). In Avery v. County of Burke, a
federal appellate court also relied on Roe in holding that a county agency would violate the
Constitution if it induced a minor woman to undergo an unwanted sterilization by misrepresenting
that she had the sickle cell trait. 660 F.2d 111, 115 (4th Cir. 1981). The dicta in Casey suggest
that some members of the current U.S. Supreme Court would closely scrutinize governmental efforts
aimed at influencing women to obtain unwanted abortions or sterilizations, at least where minor
women are involved. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
71. See Griswold v. Conn., 381 U.S. at 485 (overturning a law that banned the use of
contraceptives because such a ban would have its "maximum destructive impact" on the relationship
of the husband and wife, "a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees"); Carey v. PopulationServs. Int'l, 431 U.S. at 708 (Powell,
J., concurring) (agreeing that a New York statute that prohibited the sale of contraceptives to minors
was unconstitutional because it interfered with the well-established interest of parents to rear their
children).
72. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding that marriage is a fundamental right
protected by the Due Process Clause).
73. See Stanley v. Dlinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (holding thnt the Due Process Clause requires
that a court hold a hearing before the state tokes custody to determine the father's fitness to rear
children in a case where the parents were never married).
74. 316 U.S. at 541; see supra note 63 and accompanying text.
15. See generally John A. Robertson, Procreative liberty and the Conlrol of Conception,
Pregnancy and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 415-20 (1983) (analyzing doctrinal and ethical
arguments for a right to procreate); Elizabeth S. Scott, Sterilization ofMentally Retarded Persons:
Reproductive Rights and Family Privacy, 1986 DUKE LJ. 806, 826-40 (providing an overview of
the right to procreate, with a special focus on its application to mentally retarded persons).
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country seem to believe that no woman infected with HIV should bear
children. 76
This attitude constitutes an impermissible wholesale
categorization of certain women (women with HIV) as presumptively unfit
to bear children-an approach also applied generally to persons with
disabilities.
In this section, I discuss three measures that health care providers and
others may use to discourage women with HIV from bearing children:
involuntary sterilization, directive counseling not to procreate, and medical
interventions during pregnancy. These are just some of the measures that
can be used to prevent women with HIV from bearing children. Other
measures that are cloaked in the rhetoric of clinical judgment may be more
subtle.77

A. Involuntary Sterilization
Historically, state and private health care providers have used
involuntary sterilization to prevent poor women, women of color, and
women with disabilities from bearing children.78 Therefore, it is not
farfetched to speculate that some people may push for the involuntary
sterilization of some HIV-infected women. 79 Involuntary sterilization
persists today, in spite of the limitations imposed by the Supreme Court's
decision in Sldnner. 80 Many state statutes authorize the involuntary

76. For a discussion of this point, see Bayer, supra note 30, at 194-200 (naming lawyers,
philosophers, and eugenicists as among the proponents of discouraging or prohibiting reproduction
in HIV-positive women).
77. See infra Part IV.
78. See supra Part II.
19. Calls for involuntary or coerced sterilization appear periodically in contemporary society,
For example, in the 1950s and 1960s some slates "proposed laws which required sterilization of
unwed welfare mothers with more than two or three children because they were not 'fit to parent.'"
Sangree, supra note 48, at 323. Similar measures also were proposed in the early 1970s but ware
rejected. Id. During the 1970s, sickle cell trail was used to justify the sterilizations of AfricanAmerican women. !d. at 324. Mexican-American women often gave "consent" to sterilization
while in labor as a condition to receiving prenatal treatment or having a baby delivered. Id. at 325.
Even more recently, proposed uses for Norplanl, a chemical contraceptive that temporarily.
"sterilizes" women for up to five years, mirror the proposals of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. See,
e.g., Poverty and Norp/ant: Can Contraception Reduce the Underc/ass?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,
Dec. 12, 1990, at AlB (arguing that Norplant should be free to any woman on welfare and that
financial incentives should be given to encourage women to use it so that the "cycle of inner city
poverty" could be broken).
Already some commentators suggest that coerced abortions and compulsory sterilization may
be necessary as the number of HIV-infected women increases. See, e.g., Robert Edelman & Harry
W. Haverkos, Reply to Letter to the Editor, 261 JAMA 993, 993 (1989) (noting that, although the
writers opposed restricting the procreational autonomy of women infected with HIV, they predicted
that "as the pandemic widens and deepens in our society, increasingly powerful voices will be heard
calling for such state-imposed restrictions").
80. See supra notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
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sterilization of mentally impaired individuals and are invoked
disproportionately against women. 81 Although the Supreme Court has
not ruled directly on these statutes, the Court continues to cite Buck v. Bell
with approval when discussing reproductive issues.82 Thus, there is no
general indication that any challenge to these statutes would be successful.
In the absence of specific enabling legislation, the lower courts are
divided over the validity of involuntary sterilization. Some courts permit
court-ordered sterilization, relying on some form of the parens patriae
doctrine for authority. 83 Other courts acknowledge that a fundamental
right is involved, but they ignore the analytical implications and permit
involuntary sterilization nonetheless. 84 Most courts, however, deny

81. Approximately fourteen states have statutes authorizing involuntary sterilization of persons
with mental impairments who are deemed incapable of consent. Roberta Cepko, Involuntary
Sterili7AtionofMentallyDisabledWomen, 8BERKELEYWOMEN'S I;J. 122, 145-56 (1993); George
P. Smith, limitations on Reproductive Autonomy for the Mentally Handicapped, 4 J. CONTEMP.
HI!ALTH L. & POL'Y 71, 77 n.35 (1988).
82. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154 (1973) (explaining that the Supreme Court has never
recognized an unlimited right to privacy, as demonstrated by Buck v. Bell, and, thus, abortion rights
must be considered against state interests in regulation). Lower courts also cite Buck v. Bell to
justifY the sterilization of mentally impaired individuals. See, e.g., In re Moore, 221 S.E.2d 307,
309 (N.C. 1976) (asserting that Buck allows for the sterilization of the "feebleminded" inmates in
state institutions).
'
83. See, e.g., In re P.S., 452 N.E.2d 969, 976 (Ind. 1983) (rejecting the idea that the courts
cannot decide to involuntarily sterilize incompetents without express legislative authority); In re
Mntejski, 419 N.W.2d 576, 578-80 (Iowa 1988) (noting that the district court has, within its equity
powers, the ability to decide to involuntarily sterilize an incompetent person); In re Moe, 432
N.E.2d 712, 718-19 (Mass. 1982) (explaining that it is within the court's powers to act in the best
interests of an incompetent person, since such persons deserve a forum in which to exercise their
constitutional rights); In re Hayes, 608 P.2d 635, 638 (Wash. 1980) (determining that the courts
have inherent power to decide to order the sterilization of mentally incompetent people, just as it has
such authority to protect the interests of infants). Under the parens patriae doctrine, courts have
the "inherent power to protect those within the state who cannot protect themselves because of a
legal disability." In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d 1376, 1381 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). In other words,
the state stands in the shoes of the parent on behalf of those individuals with some legal disability
that prevents them from acting in their own behalf. See In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d 607, 612 (Alaska
1981) (asserting the plenary jurisdiction to authorize sterilization and invoking parens patriae in
support of the court's obligation to protect "incompetents"); Wentzel v. Montgomery Gen. Hosp.,
Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1253 (Md. 1982) (noting that courts of equity must have plenary jurisdiction
over disabled persons in order to afford the necessary relief to protect the interests of such
individuals); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 481 (NJ. 1981) (relying exclusively on the parens patriae
doctrine); In re Sallmaier, 378 N.Y.S.2d 989, 991 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (noting that the common law
allows the courts to act as parens patriae with respect to incompetents); see also Cepko, supra note
81, at 158 (describing how various jurisdictions use the parens patriae doctrine to order sterilizations
of incolt)petents).
84. See, e.g., Ruby v. Massey, 542 F. Supp. 361, 369 (D. Conn. 1973) (analogizing
sterilization to abortion and acknowledging that sterilization affects a woman's ability to procreate,
but then abandoning the fundamental rights analysis by holding that a mentally incompetent minor
woman's "rights" would be violated if the court-ordered sterilization was denied); see also Cepko,
supra note 81, at 159 (explaining that both federal and state courts tend to interpret statutes in ways
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petitions for involuntary sterilization of mentally disabled individuals in the
absence of some statutory authorization. 85
Most of the modem involuntary sterilization cases involve women who
lack the legal capacity to consent to sterilization.86 In these cases, the
judgment of someone else is substituted for that of the woman, and that
person controls the sterilization decision. Arguably, these cases are
distinguishable from most cases involving women infected with HIV.
There may be a few HIV-infected women who suffer some preexisting
disability affecting their legal capacity, or who, as a result of HIV, are so
neurologically impaired as to lack legal capacity. These cases would be
most analogous to the current involuntary sterilization cases but would be
relatively rare.
Although involuntary sterilization laws have their roots in the eugenics
movement of the 1920s,87 several other reasons are given to justify the
involuntary sterilization of disabled women today. For example, in several
cases, petitioners for involuntary sterilization of developmentally disabled
women argued that mentally impaired individuals are incapable of adequate
parenting and, therefore, that their offspring will become a financial burden
on the state. 88 A number of courts reject the financial-burden

that expand their power to authorize involuntary sterilization).
85. Most of these cases, however, were decided before Stump v. Sparlanan, in which the
Supreme Court held that a judge who authorized the sterilization of a "somewhat retarded" minor
in a state without an enabling statute was immune from suit. 435 U.S. 349 (1978). Although the
Court never addressed the specific issue of whether a judge legally could authorize involuntary
sterilization in the absence of any state Jaw, post-Stump decisions often cite the case for that
principle. See, e.g., In re C.D.M., 627 P.2d at 611 (stating that a state superior court has the
jurisdiction to make sterilization decisions because no state statute or case law specifically prevents
it); In re Terwilliger, 450 A.2d at 1379-80 (noting that an orphans' court has jurisdiction to rule
on the sterilization of a mentally disabled woman because Stump held that courts have jurisdiction
to rule unless case law or statutes prohibit it).
86. See infra note 88 and accompanying text. In these cases, the court grants a petition by a
parent or guardian to sterilize a person who has not consented to the procedure, usually after a
hearing. See id. These cases should be distinguished from cases of coerced sterilization.
87. See generally PHIUP R. REILLY, THE SUROICAL SOLUTION: A HISTORY OF INVOLUNTARY
STERlUZATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1991) (discussing the origin of the eugenics movement in
the United States and the involuntary sterilization laws that were produced largely as a result of the
movement). Reilly describes two waves of sterilization Jaws. State legislatures enacted a number
of sterilization laws between 1909 and 1913. Id. at 71. These laws were directed primarily at
prisoners, feeble-minded persons, and the insane. Id. at 41. The courts struck down many of these
laws as cruel and unusual punishment or as violative of the Due Process Clause or the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 50-55. The second wave of the eugenics sterilization laws began after
1922, fueled largely by concerns about the large increase in immigration and the move of African
Americans to the North. Id. at 71-72.
88. See, e.g., Guardianship ofKemp, 118 Cal. Rptr. 64, 65 (Ct. App. 1974) (reversing a lower
court order that granted the involuntary sterilization petition of the parents of a developmentally
disabled adult woman, claiming financial burden to both them and the general public); Wentzel v.
Montgomery Gen. Hosp., Inc., 447 A.2d 1244, 1247-48, 1254 (Md. 1982) (refusing to order a
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justification, reasoning that the issue in each case is the best interest of the
woman and not the welfare of society, 89 but a few courts accept this
justification.90 In fact, two states by statute expressly authorize
involuntary sterilization based on the ground of benefit to society. 91
The benefit-to-society line of argument is actually a manifestation of
long-standing societal hostility towards disfavored groups:
This "societal concern" over preventing the birth of children to poor
incompetent women indicates that the sentiment expressed by Justice
Holmes in Buck that society benefits from sterilizing those who "sap the
strength of the State" retains popularity. Indeed, the culture remains
preoccupied with coercing poor women, incompetent or not, from
reproducing • • • . In the sterilization context, "inability to care for
children" refers to more than the resources necessary to actually care for
children.•.. The implication is that "inability to care for children" are
code words that justify societal control of mentally disabled women's
reproduction. 92

This same concern applies to another class of women with disabilities,
women infected with HIV, and the financial-burden justification is implicit
in arguments advanced today to justify discouraging HIV-infected women
from bearing children.93 Since existing case law at both the federal and
state levels does not clearly support or refute th~ financial-burden rationale,
it is important that federal antidiscrimination laws aimed at protecting
sterilization procedure for a retarded 13-year-old girl and rejecting inter alia the guardian's argument
that the girl's child will place a financial burden on the state); In re Simpson, 180 N.E.2d 206, 208
(Ohio P. Ct. 1962) (ordering the sterilization of a developmentally disabled woman, who had one
child already for whom she could not provide adequate care, and justifYing the ruling on the ground
that further pregnancies would create additional burdens on the county and state welfare
departments); Frazierv. Levi, 440 S.W.2d 393, 394-95 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969) (rejecting a mother's
petition requesting the sterilization of her mentally incompetent daughter in which the mother
asserted that she could not afford to care for any more of her daughter's children).
89. Wentzel v. Gen. Hosp., 447 A.2d at 1254 (allowing court-ordered sterilization of
incompetent minors when it is in the best interest of the child as determined through specified
procedures); In re Grady, 426 A.2d 467, 481 n.8 (N.J. 1981) (authorizing the sterilization of
incompetent persons when it is found to be in their best interest).
90. See, e.g., North Carolina Ass'n for Retarded Children v. North Carolina, 420 F. Supp.
451, 457-58 (M.D.N.C. 1976) (upholding a statute allowing sterilization of mentally defective
persons when it is determined to be in the best interests of the general public); In re Simpson, 180
N.E.2d at 208 (accepting the argument that additional children would impose a burden on the welfare
department in authorizing a developmentally disabled woman's sterilization).
91. See Mrss. CoDE ANN. § 41-45-1 (1993) {allowing sterilization if the procedure is in the best
interest of the state and the patient); N.C. GEN. SrAT. §§ 35-36 to 35-SO (1992) (permitting the
sterilization of a mentally retarded individual if it is in the best interest of the individual or if the
interests of societY would be furthered by the sterilization).
92. Cepko, supra note 81, at 161-62.
93. See, e.g., Doe v. Jamaica Hospital, supra note 4, at 27 (involving an lllV-infected woman
who was told by a health care provider that abortion was the best alternative because a baby with
AIDS "would suffer and become a burden on society").
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individuals with disabilities clarify this issue.
A second argument asserted to justify the involuntary sterilization of
mentally impaired individuals is the need to prevent the birth of children
with physical and/or mental defects. Admittedly, there is a real possibility
that some children of women with HIV will be born infected with the
virus. 94 Those people who express concern about the quality of life of
a disabled infant argue that living with a disability is too great a burden to
impose on a person. 95 This value-laden conclusion, however, denigrates
the personal worth of people with disabilities and runs counter to the
objectives of the ADA. 96 Moreover, similar arguments have been made
unsuccessfully in tort actions for wrongful life.97 Although a policy to
limit the birth of children with disabilities would seem to be an
impermissible basis for restricting procreational autonomy, the ADA does
not squarely address this issue.
Other than the societal antagonism toward individuals with disabilities,
the quality-of-life argument in support of discouraging the birth of infants
with disabilities may be a disguised variant of the financial-burden
argument. Individuals are likely to assume that taxpayers will share some
or all of the costs of the care of disabled children. Therefore, some may
argue that preventing the birth of children with disabilities is "good" for
society because their absence from society reduces the "financial costs" to
taxpayers.
Some philosophers and lawyers argue that there is a moral limit on the
exercise of reproductive freedom, namely situations where others may be
injured. 98 Taken together with the financial-burden and quality-of-life
arguments, this argument is used by these commentators to justify
intervention by government and health care providers in the reproductive

94. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
96. Some of the objectives of the ADA are: (1) to increase the dignity and independence of
individuals with disabilities; (2) to provide them the opportunity to be fully participating members
of society; and (3) to eliminate major obstacles that are not inherent in each individual's disability
but that arise from external and unnecessary barriers. NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THB HANDICAPPED,
ON THE THRESHOLD OF INDEPENDENCE, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THB CONGRESS OF THE
UNITED STATES XN-XV {1988).
97. In wrongful life actions, the child sues the healthcareproviderclaiming that the provider's
negligence caused the child's life and that life itself is the impairment for which the child r;eeks
compensation. Generally, the courts deny recovery for policy reasons, citing their "inability" to
measure the value of never having been born as the justification for denying relief. These courts
feel uncomfortable with arguments that value not being born over life as a disabled person. See W.
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 55, at 370-73 {5th ed.
1984) (discussing the tort of "wrongful life" and judges' reluctance to allow recovery on this type
of claim).
98. See Bayer, supra note 30, at 194 ("The 'harm principle' ••• provides a moral limit on the
exercise of freedom when others may be injured •.•• ").
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decisions of women infected with HIV. 99 Undoubtedly, a few people
might advocate extreme intervention in the form of compulsory temporary
or permanent sterilization of noncompliant HIV-infected women and this
attitude is consistent with the historical attitudes toward women and
childbearing. 100 Such a proposal, whatever the proffered justifications,
is clearly, as I noted earlier, inconsistent with the spirit of the ADA. 101

B. Discouraging Pregnancy
Although a few health care decision makers might advocate
involuntary sterilization of HIV-infected women, most health care decision
makers would oppose such proposals. They would nonetheless favor less
coercive means of discouraging these women from bearing children.
Currently, reproductive-related counseling of HIV-infected women is not
regulated, and many health care professionals are quietly advocating
directive counseling for women who are identified as HIV-positive and
fertile. 102 Directive counseling occurs when the patient does not receive
an unbiased assessment of her medical situation and thus cannot make an
informed personal decision free of persuasive, or even coercive, influences.
Because of the potential for the patient to transmit HIV to her child
perinatally, the question of whether an HIV-infected woman should become
pregnant or should continue her pregnancy after she learns of her HIVpositive status is value-laden. The health care provider may have strong
opinions on the undesirability of an HIV-positive woman having a child.
The situation is ripe for health care providers to abuse their power through
directive counseling.
As a result, patients may be led into accepting treatments or
undergoing procedures which strip them of their bodily autonomy. 103
Health care providers may innocently or negligently misrepresent the rate

99. See, e.g., Arras, supra note 27, at 373 (discussing some of the more radical coercive
interventions into the reproductive choices of HIV-positive women, such as forced sterilization,
abortion, and the threat of cutting off health benefits if the woman chooses to have the child).
100. See generally Ikemoto, supra note 37, at 1257-58 (noting that the nineteenth century view
of women as childbearers led to the beliefthat "extraordinary" restrictions could be placed on their
lives).
101. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
102. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
103. For example, the health care provider is concerned about both the pregnant woman and
her potential child. The provider may believe that there are some treatments or medical procedures
designed to benefit the potential child that the pregnant woman resists. As a result, the woman may
be coerced to undergo the treatment or medical procedure and thus be labeled a bad or uncaring
mother for resisting medical advice. Increased incidents of court-ordered medical interventions
involving pregnant women suggest that some courts consider these women to be obligated to do all
that is necessary, short of giving up their lives, to enhance the health and survival of their potential
children. See infra Part m.c.
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of vertical transmission of HIV. Providers may not clearly distinguish
between advice relating to childbearing that is based on current medical
information and advice that represents the provider's personal opinion
about what is best for the patient's or potential child's well-being. This socalled medically based advice can have a powerful and perhaps coercive
effect on some women's reproductive decision making.
Where the state or federal government is the health care provider, the
Constitution may offer HIV-infected women some protection against
directive counseling. First, directive counseling to abort may violate a
woman's right to privacy. 104 Second, it is also arguable that the
counseling of a woman to have an abortion by a government agent violates
the government's duty to protect the fetus. Even in Roe v. Wade, the
Court recognized that at some point the government has an interest in
protecting the fetus, and this interest justifies restricting the privacy interest
of a pregnant woman. 105 This interest is in conflict, however, with the
previously mentioned financial-burden and quality-of-life arguments
advanced in support of involuntary sterilization of disabled women. 106
A government may advance these arguments to support discouraging HIVinfected women from becoming pregnant. The courts have not addressed
this conflict, and it remains unclear whether or under what circumstances
a government agent can counsel, compel, or coerce a woman to terminate
a pregnancy.
Even if these issues were clear, the courts generally have construed
the Fourteenth Amendment to cover only state actors and most likely it
cannot be used to protect women harmed by private-sector health care
providers. Given the lack of protection some women face, the scope of
federal statutory protection like the ADA becomes particularly important.
Thus, women infected with HIV are a good paradigm to use when
discussing the need for specific legislation under the ADA to protect the
reproductive choices of all women with disabilities.

104. Granted, the Supreme Court's decision in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey raises questions about the exact standard to be applied in these cases. 112
S. Ct. 2791 (1992); see supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. Casey, however, involved on
individual's choice about not bearing a child postconception. /d. Thus, arguably, once a woman
has exercised her right to procreate, any governmental action which interferes with procreation is
more personal and invasive. See supra note 70.
105. 410 U.S. at 150. The Court noted: "In assessing the State's interest, recognition may be
given to the .•• cloim that as long as at least potentia/life is involved, the State may assert interests
beyond the protection of the pregnant woman alone." /d.
106. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
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C. Medical Interventions During Pregnancy
"Access to care appears to be a continuing, many say increasing,
problem for HIV-infected women." 107 This is not surprising since the
women disproportionately affected by the epidemic traditionally have the
least access to health care. 108 Even when access to health care is
available, HIV-infected women are likely to be treated differently from
other women because of their seropositive status. 109 Some difference in
treatment may be medically warranted, but other differences in treatment
or medical information may be based solely on the connection between a
woman's seropositive status and her ability to become pregnant and
possibly transmit HIV perinatally.
One leading principle of bioethics is that there should be "respect for
persons." This principle means "that individuals should be treated as
autonomous agents and that persons with diminished autonomy are entitled
to protection. " 110 This principle of respect for persons would seem to
support the notion of nondirective counseling and general autonomy for
women in reproductive matters. As applied to pregnant women, however,
this principle has been interpreted to mean that the fetus also is entitled to
protection because of its diminished capacity. 111
A second leading principle of bioethics is that of "beneficence," which
dictates "that persons are treated in an ethical manner not only by
respecting their decisions and protecting them from harm, but also by
making efforts to secure their best interests or well-being. " 112 The
physician often sees her obligation to pregnant women under this principle
as the protection and promotion of the best interests of both the women and

107. Goldsmith, supra note 35, at 1816. Goldsmith quotes Dr. PatriciaKioser from the New
Jersey Medical School to the effect that '"My guess is that in Newark there are 10 lllV-infected
women untreated in the community for every one that is in the clinic for care.'" Jd.
108. See Margaret C. Heagarty & Elaine J. Abrams, Caring for HW-Jnfected Women and
Children, 326 NEW ENG. J. MED. 887, 887 (1992) (explaining that most women and children with
lllV are poor, urban, minority-group members who hnve limited access to health care).
109. See infra notes 138-153 and accompanying text for a discussion ofHIV-positive women's
experiences in obtaining abortion services.
110. Alan R. Fleischman, 1he Fetus Is a Patient, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990s,
supra note 44, at 249, 250.
111. Id. There is some disagreement about whether the fetus possesses autonomy or merely
the potential for autonomy. For example, under the bioethical principle of "beneficence," the
"interests of the fetus do not stem from its moral status as an independent entity, but derive from
its future standing as an infant and child, as well as n future member of the moral community." Id.
at 250-51; see also Kolder et al., supra note 37, at 1194 (explaining how applications of wrongful
death statutes and suits for compensation for injuries incurred before conception that later cause fetal
injuries cut against the recognition of the fetus as an independent person since they require that the
child be born alive). A more complete discussion of this point is beyond the scope of this Article.
112. Fleischman, supra note 110, at 250.
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their fetuses. Where these interests conflict, the medical outcome (live or
well woman versus live birth or well infant) should be determinative of in
whose favor the balance is struck. 113 Applying this principle, if the
outcome is the live birth of a baby and the medical procedure used poses
minimal health risks for the mother, any objections of the mother should
be discounted.
I agree with feminists who oppose bioethicists and others who place
the mother and her fetus in conflicting positions;114 however, given the
trend in medicine toward treating the fetus as a patient, it is foreseeable
that women infected with HIV who decide to become pregnant will be
more likely than most other pregnant women to be subject to forced
medical interventions on behalf of the fetus. Studies of court-ordered fetal
interventions indicate that they are more likely when the pregnant woman
is poor, a woman of color, or a patient in a public hospital. 115 As
mentioned previously, the current demographics of women with HIV fit
this profile. 116 Health care providers may question the judgment of any
woman with HIV who consciously chooses to become pregnant after
learning that she is infected. Once the woman becomes pregnant, the
provider's attention is divided between the woman and her fetus. Thus, the
impact of these two leading principles of bioethics on the current thinking
about the propriety of HN-infected women bearing children is extensive
and weighs heavily against autonomy. Recognition that a fully informed,
otherwise competent pregnant woman has a right to control medical
decisions regarding the health of herself and her fetus is long overdue.
Lack of autonomy in this area is especially problematic for disabled
women, and the ADA is silent.
Given that seventy to eighty percent of the babies born to women
infected with HN will not have the virus, 117 and thus will have the
potential to reach adulthood long after their mothers have died, a health
care provider may conclude that it is more important to ensure the future
health of this child, even at the expense of its mother. The provider will

113. Id. (arguing that physicians must weigh the benefits and the risks for both the mother and
the fetus and make therapeutic choices).
114. See generally Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions and Interventions: What's Wrong With
Fetal Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1987) (exploring the fundamental rights of a pregnant
woman that protect her against governmental intrusion into her medical decisions); Dawn E.
Johnsen, Note, 7he Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional RiglJts to
liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95 YALE LJ. 599 (1986) (discussing the development of
fetal rights doctrine which creates an adversarial relationship between a woman and her fetus).
115. See Kolder et al., supra note 37, at 1195 (noting from the results of a national survey that
81 % of women forced to undergo court-ordered interventions were minorities, 44% were unmarried,
and all were in public hospitals or receiving public assistance).
116. See supra notes 22-23 and accompanying text.
117. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
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be unsympathetic to a woman's refusal to act in the manner recommended
as most beneficial for her child. She may continue to take illegal
substances, use alcohol, eat improperly, or otherwise threaten the wellbeing of her fetus. Some providers will simply use all available forms of
moral persuasion to influence their noncompliant patients, but others may
resort to the courts in overriding the patients' autonomy and seeking legal
action to guarantee compliance. Although health care providers who seek
such court orders tend to do so out of an excess of enthusiasm or even
arrogance, many courts are likely to side with them, especially given the
socioeconomic and medical status of the noncompliant pregnant women
withHIV.
IV. Rights Under the ADA

A.

General Overview of Access to Medical Care Under the ADA

Elimination of discrimination in access to health care was a goal of the
ADA, 118 and the House Committee on Education and Labor's report on
the ADA explicitly referred to the continuous discrimination in medical
treatment against individuals with disabilities. 119 The legislative history
of the ADA, however, indicates that Congress did not intend to require
health care providers to render treatment that is outside the providers' area
of specialty. 120 The ADA also does not require a health care provider
to render treatment in a situation where the disabling condition creates
specialized complications for the patient's health that the provider lacks
either the knowledge or the experience to address. 121 Under the ADA,
a health care provider can only refer a disabled patient to another health
care provider when she would refer other patients with the same
condition. 122
In this respect, the ADA modifies the common law regarding the
duties of medical professionals. At common law, health care providers
were under no legal obligation to treat any patient in need. 123 Even

118. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3) (Supp. m 1991) ("[D]iscriminationagainst individuals with
disabilities persists in such critical areas as ••• h~th care •••• ").
119. See H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 31 (1989), reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 312 (noting that discrimination against the disabled occurs in almost every
aspect of their lives, including medical treatment).
120. !d. at 105-06, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 389.
121. !d. at 106, reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 389.
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(1)(A)(iii) (Supp. m 1991) (noting that it is discriminatory to
provide disabled individuals with public accommodations that are different or separate from those
provided to other individuals "unless such action is necessary to provide the individual ••• with a[n]
••• accommodation ••• that is as effective as that provided to others").
123. Goslin, supra note 5, at 250.
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where the required care fell within the health care provider's competence,
physicians could base their decisions not to treat upon cost (i.e., in refusing
poor patients), 124 prejudice (i.e., in discrimination on the basis of race
or lifestyle), 125 liability concerns, 126 or subtle judgments about which
patients deserve scarce health care resources. 127 Without question, the
ADA prohibits medical decisions not to treat that are based solely on
prejudice stemming from a person's disability. Nevertheless, since most
commentators agree that the ADA does not guarantee access to health care,
but simply prohibits denial of equal access based on a person's disability,
a private health care provider still can refuse legally to treat based on a
patient's inability to pay. 128 Provider decisions based on liability
concerns or subtle judgments about patient access to scarce health care
resources are less clearly violative of the ADA. 129 Undoubtedly, some
of these issues will arise in the context of treating HIV-infected women of
childbearing age. 130
124. See id. (noting that many physicians based their decision not to treat mY-infected
individuals on the costs associated with caring for uninsured or Medicaid patients).
125. See id. (describing how civil rights legislation made it illegal for physicians to discriminate
on the basis of sex or race but noting that discrimination based on lifestyle (i.e. drug use) still
occurred before the advent of the ADA).
126. For example, today some physicians refuse to deliver babies because they fear medical
malpractice suits for children born with certain disabilities. See Jane Perkins & Kathleen Stoll,
Medical Malpractice: A "Crisis" for Poor Women, 20 CLEARlNGHOUSB RBv. 1277, 1278 (1987)
(noting that physicians, particularly obstetricians and gynecologists, are unwilling to treat poor and
minority women due in part to the increased risk of malpractice liability caused by the health status
of these women). It should be noted that the perception that poor patients sue more frequently for
medical malpractice is a myth. See Molly McNulty, Are Poor Patients More Likely to Sue for
Malpractice?, 262 JAMA 1391, 1391-92 (1989) (explaining that poor people who have been victims
of medical malpractice rarely pursue their right to sue); Mary G. Mussman et at., Medical
Malpractice Claims Filed by Medicaid and Non-Medicaid Recipients in Maryland, 265 JAMA 2992,
2994 (1991) (finding that, despite physicians' concerns about malpractice suits being filed by
Medicaid patients, these patients were no more likely to sue than non-Medicaid patients).
127. Goslin, supra note 5, at 250.
128. There is some question about whether a public, as opposed to a private, health care
provider can refuse to treat a disabled person based on cost. In August 1992, the Bush
Administration refused to give Oregon an exception under the federal Medicaid program so that the
state could institute an experimental health care rationing program designed to significantly increase
access to health care for people in that state. The Administration reasoned that the Oregon plan,
which excluded certain highly expensive categories from Medicaid coverage, would violate the ADA
because the restriction would have a disproportionate impact on people with disabilities. Spencer
Rich, Oregon Medicaid Rationing Program Rejected as Biased against Disabled, WASH. PoST, Aug.
4, 1992, at AS.
129. For example, in my opinion, a physician could refuse, as a matter of policy, to treat
certain conditions in individuals over 70 years of age because of liability concerns and concerns
about the use of scarce health care resources by individuals with shortened life expectancies. Even
though a disproportionate number of people over 70 have some disabling condition, unless the
disabled person could prove that the primary basis for the physician's refusal to provide treatment
was a protected disabling condition under the ADA, there would be no basis under the ADA for an
unlawful discrimination claim.
130. For example, some physicians might be concerned about their legal liability for counseling
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Although section 301(7) of the ADA broadly defines "public
accommodation" to include the professional office of a health care
provider, hospital, or other service establishment,131 the substantive
guarantee of access to public accommodations under the ADA is qualified.
The Act does not require a public accommodation to permit an individual
to participate in or benefit from the goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, and accommodations of the public accommodation if that
individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety of others.132 The
ADA defines "direct threat" as "a significant risk to the health or safety of
others that cannot be eliminated" by modifying policies, practices, or
procedures or by providing auxiliary aids or services.133
The regulations promulgated under the Act set forth a test to
determine whether an individual poses a direct threat to the health or safety
of others. The test requires a three-prong individualized assessment based
on reasonable judgment that looks at: (1) the current medical evidence or
the best available objective evidence to determine the nature, duration, and
severity of the risk; (2) the probability that the potential injury will actually
occur; and (3) whether reasonable modifications of policies, practices, or
procedures will mitigate the risk. 134 This is essentially the same approach
adopted under the Rehabilitation Act. 135 Thus, under the ADA, no

an mv-infected woman to become pregnant because they fear a child born with mv might file a
civil action for wrongful life. As a general rule, however, most courts have refused to entertain
these suits because they require courts to find that living with an impairment is worse than nevei'
having been born. KEEI'ON et al., supra note 97, at 370-71. Physicians also fear that parents will
bring a wrongful birth action to recover for injuries the parents incurred from the birth of an
unwanted and impaired child. Generally, wrongful birth suits have been brought whei'e there was
a genetically transmissible disordei' and the physician failed to recognize the risk, failed to test foi'
the disorder, or failed to inform the parents of the risk of transmission. ld. at 370. For a more
complete discussion of the question of health-care-provider tort liability and women with mv, see
Karen H. Rothenberg, Reproductive Choice and Reality: An Assessment of Tort Liability foi' Health
Care Providers and Women with lllV/AIDS 21-23 (Sept. 30, 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the authoi') (examining the current legal standards and potential foi' maternal and health-careprovidei' tort liability at various points of the decision-making process foi' IDV-positive women).
An example of a situation where a health care providei' might claim limited resources as a
basis for refusing to treat a woman infected with mv is a request for infertility services. See infra
Part IV.B.2.a.
131. Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 301, 104 Stat. 327,354 (codified at42 U.S.C. § 12181(7) (Supp.
m 1991)).
132. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (Supp. ill 1991); 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (1992).
133. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (Supp. ill 1991); 28 C.P.R. § 36.208 (1992); see 28 C.F.R. §
36.302 (1992) {specifying that public accommodations must make reasonable modifications in their
policies, practices, and procedures, if necessary, in order to provide goods and services to
individuals with disabilities); 28 C.F.R. § 36.303 (1992) (mandating that places of accommodation
must provide the auxiliary aids and services necessary to prevent the exclusion OI' segregation of
persons with disabilities).
134. 28 C.F.R. § 36.208 (1992).
135. Cf. Doe v. Centinela Hosp., No. CV 87-2514, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8401, at "'28 (C.D.
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covered health care provider can refuse to accept a disabled person as a
patient, unless it can be shown that either the treatment required is outside
the provider's area of specialty or that the disabled person poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others, including the health care provider.
Nevertheless, this test does not help courts to distinguish clearly a
lawful refusal to treat based on genuine clinical judgment from an unlawful
refusal based on bias against an individual's disability:
While the act certainly prohibits a refusal to treat based upon prejudice
or irrational fear, some medical practices are far more subtle.
Practitioners are defending their decisions to not treat or to refer patients
with communicable conditions by arguing that this is an exercise of
clinical judgment and does not constitute discrimination, and that to
restrict the physician's right to decide whom to treat or when to refer is
to dictate the practice of medicine. 136

Since the ADA provides no real guidance on this issue, a question exists
as to the extent to which courts will review medical decisions involving
patients with disabilities. 137
There is little relevant case law on determining when a decision not
to provide medical services is based on a legitimate clinical judgment and
when the decision constitutes unlawful discrimination. In the one
analogous case under the Rehabilitation Act, Doe v. Jamaica Hospital) the
state court never reached these substantive issues because it ruled that since
the physician-hospital employee did not directly receive any federal funds,
he was not personally liable under the statute. 138 Nevertheless, the
plaintiff's allegations illustrate the problems inherent when courts are
inclined, often out of necessity, to rely on medical judgments that may be
biased or unscientific.
In Jamaica Hospital, the plaintiff, Carol Doe, learned that she was

Cal. July 7, 1988) (explaining that to determine whether the exclusion of an IDV-infcctcd person
from a drug treatment program fell within the "direct threat" exception of the Rehabilitation Act
required the court to examine several factors, including the nature, duration, and severity of the risk
and the probability that there would be harm to others).
136. Goslin, supra note 5, at 251.
137. In School Board ofNassau County, Florida v. Arline, a Rehabilitation Act case, however,
the U.S. Supreme Court said that "courts normally should defer to the reasonable medicaljudgmcnts
of public health officials." 480 U.S. 273, 288 (1987). Lawrence Goslin claims, though, that
"increasingly courts are looking beyond the mantle of clinical judgment and are examining patterns
of behavior that may be masking prejudice." Goslin, supra note 5, at 251.
138. See Doe v. Jamaica Hospital, supra note 4, at 27 (granting the physician's motion for
summey judgment as to the cause of action in the complaint which alleged a violation of section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973). The court noted that the U.S. Supreme Court had limited the
reach of section 504 to persons or entities who actually receive funds and not to persons, such as
this physician, who indirectly benefit from the federal funds. /d. (citing U.S. Dep't ofTransp. v.
Paralyzed Veterans, 477 U.S. 591, 606-07 (1985)).
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pregnant in 1988. 139 Because she was 38 years old, weighed over 300
pounds, and had previously given birth to a child with spina bifida, she
chose to attend a high risk, prenatal clinic at Jamaica Hospital.140 Doe
alleged that, when she tested positive for HIV, both the social worker and
a prenatal clinic specialist informed her that her chances of having a baby
with AIDS were great and that she should have an abortion. 141 They
referred Doe to the Chief of Obstetrics and Gynecology, who referred her
to another hospital that the physician claimed was better qualified to treat
a pregnant woman infected with HIV. 142 She subsequently had an
abortion performed at the second hospital.143
In 1989, Carol Doe filed a civil action against both hospitals and the
physician, alleging that they arbitrarily discriminated against her due to her
physical disability-HIV. 144 She alleged this discrimination violated
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973. In her complaint, Carol Doe
asserted that she had been denied treatment at Jamaica Hospital because of
her seropositive status and that she had received separate, different,
unequal, and ineffective counseling upon which to make her reproductive
choices based on her seropositive status. 145 She also asserted that the
hospital that performed the abortion had failed to counsel her about the
reproductive choices available to her based on her seropositive status. 146
This would seem to be an easy case under the ADA. Unless the
health care provider could establish that the patient's seropositive status
created specialized complications for her health for which the provider
lacked either the knowledge or experience to address, or that her HIV
status caused some direct threat to others, the ADA was apparently
violated. Under the facts of the case, the health care provider would seem
to have a difficult burden of proof under the ADA.
In 1990, the New York City Commission on Human Rights conducted
an investigation of fifty health centers that offered abortions. 147 Twenty

139. Id.
140. !d.
141. Id.
142. Id. The physician also claimed he counseled Doe on the physical and emotional effects
of HIV infection and on her fears of having another child born with spina bifida. fu contrast, the
court relates that Doe claimed that the doctor told her that "having a baby with AIDS is worse than
having a baby with spina bifida, that the baby would suffer and become a burden on society, [and]
that she should have an abortion •••• " Id.
143. !d.
144. !d. (citing§ 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973).
.
145. !d.
146. Id.
147. See Elisabeth Rosenthal, Aborlion Clinics Often Reject Patients With the AIDS Virus, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 23, 1990, at A1 (discussing the problems faced by HIV-positive women seeking
abortions).
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of these clinics refused to provide medical services once they were told that
the patient had tested positive for HN. 148 Most often these clinics cited
"medical" factors, such as the lack of appropriate sterilization equipment
and inexperience in treating HIV-infected patients, to justify their refusal
to perform the abortions. 149 The Commission learned from medical
experts that the abortion and sterilization procedures for women infected
with HIV are no different from the procedures used for uninfected
women. 150 The risk of transmission of the virus from patient to
physician is "very small, but finite" provided physicians follow universal
blood precaution procedures. 151 If the provider claimed, however, that
she referred the patient to another facility because of some other risk
factor, like drug use, that might complicate the situation. 152
Thus, these abortion providers seem to be violating the ADA. They
cannot show that the woman's HIV infection creates special problems that
they lack the knowledge or expertise to address. Because of their ability
148. /d. The centers included free-standing clinics and abortion clinics in hospitals. /d.
149. /d.
150. /d.
151. /d. at BS. Although the risk of HIV transmission from patient to health care provider
exists, there are few reported cases of such work-related transmission. See Centers for Disease
Control and Prevention, Surveillance ofOccupationally Acquired HIV Infection-United States, 19811992, 268 JAMA 3294, 3294 (1992) (reporting that, as of September 1992, there were 32
documented and 69 possible occupationally acquired cases of HIV infection). The risk of infection
varies according to the type of medical procedure involved. When the procedure called for is
noninvasive, the risk of transmission of the virus is extremely low. When invasive procedures are
warranted, and the health care provider is likely to be exposed to blood and other bodily fluids, the
risk of transmission of HIV is greater. Nevertheless, the CDC concurs with the findings of the
Commission that the risk of transmission may be significantly reduced by adopting the recommended
safety precautions. See Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Recommendations for

Preventing Transmission ofHuman Immunodeficiency Vims and Hepatitis B Vims to Patients During
Exposure-Prone Invasive Procedures, 40 MORBIDITY & MORTAUTY WKLY. REP.,
REcOMMENDATIONS & REPs. 5·6 (1991) (outlining the precautions that health care providers and
facilities should use to prevent transmission from providers to patients).
152. The ADA makes a theoretical distinction between the use of an illegal substance and the
status of being addicted. Addiction is considered a disability, although in most instances the ADA
excludes illegal drug users from coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 12210 (Supp. m 1991); see 28 C.F.R. §
36.104 (1992) (defining current illegal use of drugs as use that occurred recently enough to justify
a reasonable belief that a person's drug use is current or that continuing use is a real and ongoing
problem). The law provides a limited exception for health services, or services provided in
connection with drug rehabilitation, if the individual is otherwise entitled to such services. 42
U.S.C. § 12210; see 28 C.F.R. § 36.209(b) (1992) (explaining when an individual is entitled to
public health services, despite current drug use). Thus, if the provider could prove that drug-using
pregnant women always were referred to other providers, the action would not violate federal
antidiscrimination law. One can envision, however, a situation where a blanket policy to exclude
drug-using pregnant women from certain medical services is merely a cover to avoid treating women
infected with mv. a disproportionate number of whom currently are identified as having drug-using
histories. See supra note 24 and aecompanying text. It might be difficult under the ADA to
distinguish between a lawful denial of services because of current drug use and an intent to
discriminate against a protected disabled group, some of whom are also drug users.
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to substantially minimize the risk of transmission, they will have a difficult
time showing that HIV-infected women present a direct threat to others.
The ability to control the risk of transmission presents an especially strong
argument that HIV infection alone is an insufficient basis for denying
medical treatment to an otherwise qualified patient. 153

B. Access to Reproductive IJiformation and Services
1. Directive Counseling to Forego Childbearing
Undoubtedly, there will be some HIV-infected women without AIDS
symptoms who will consciously want to become pregnant.154 I am
arguing that a health care professional who directly counsels all women
with HIV not to become pregnant may violate the ADA under some
circumstances. Some may contend that directive counseling is appropriate
and does not violate the ADA since it will dissuade some HIV-positive
women from bearing children but will not pose an impenetrable barrier to
childbearing. While it is true that counseling cannot be equated with a
direct prohibition, many women, irrespective of their race or education, do
not seriously question health-related advice from medical providers, and
this is particularly true of low-income women. 155 Therefore, so-called
clinical advice can have a powerful and perhaps coercive effect on some
women's reproductive decision making.
Unfortunately, many women first learn of their seropositive status
during pregnancy or at the time their child is born. 156 Currently, the
CDC recommends that all fertile women "at risk" for HIV infection be
routinely tested. 157 Given the sharp increase in HIV infection among

153. Lawrence Goslin, executive director of the American Society of Law and Medicine, agrees
with this conclusion:
Courts ••• are unlikely to accept occupational risks as a justification for discrimination:
The risk is exceedingly low and can be kept low through the "reasonable
accommodation" of strict adherence to infection control procedures. Health care
professionals will probably be expected to accept some level of risk in carrying out their
jobs in the same way that fire fighters or police officers cannot excuse themselves from
particularly dangerous assignments.
Goslin, supra note 5, at 251.
154. Preliminary data suggest that there is no difference between the reproductive decisions of
infected and uninfected women. See Bayer, supra note 30, at 180 (discussing the problem of AIDS
transmission from mother to fetus).
155. Nsioh-Jefferson, supra note 44, at 39.
156. See, e.g., Lindgren et al., supra note 33, at 1112 (reporting that three-fourths of the
women in a study of maternal-fetal transmissions ofHIV were diagnosed during pregnancy or within
a few weeks after giving birth).
157. Lawrence L. Minkoff, Care of Pregnant Women Infected with Human lmmunodeficlency
VitUS, 258 JAMA 2714, 2714 (1987). The Centers for Disease Control is currently revising this
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women and the risk of perinatal transmission, it seems likely that the
CDC's future recommendations will continue to advise the testing of
women of childbearing age to prevent perinatal transmission of the virus.
Undoubtedly, voluntary testing of fertile women should be encouraged to
give women information about their health. When the goal also includes
minimizing the risk of perinatal transmission of HIV, testing is most
valuable if it occurs before pregnancy. At that point, an HIV-positive
woman can make an informed choice about whether to become pregnant.
Any HIV testing of fertile women designed to minimize the risk of
perinatal transmission of the virus raises the issue of what information
should be provided to fertile HIV-positive women. Counseling is an
essential component of any HIV-testing program, but, when counseling on
reproductive matters, an approach that fully respects and facilitates patient
autonomy in the decision-making process is most appropriate. Although
a fairly recent development in both law and medicine, it generally is
accepted today that the patient's values should govern medical decision
making. ISS As some commentators point out, however, practice lags
behind theory in the medical community. 1S9 "[P]hysicians routinely
make judgments based on risk-benefit calculations, judgments that could
plausibly be viewed as not purely medical and that therefore could be made
by patients based on their personal benefit and risk preferences. " 160
Currently, HIV counseling is not regulated. As noted in the
introduction to this Article, however, governmental and medical
organizations recommend directing HIV-positive women not to become

guideline. CDC, Recommendations, supra note 29, at 724.
ISS. In law, this principle is embodied in the tort doctrine of informed consent. See, e.g.,
Canterburyv. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780-Sl (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972)
(citing the proposition that true consent can only be gained when a patient is knowledgeable about
his or her options and the attendant risks); JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND
PATIENT (1984) (exploring the doctor-patient relationship and the decision-making process); David
Orentlicher, The Rlusion of Patient Choice in End-of-life Decisions, 267 JAMA 2101 (1992)
(describing the societal consensus that patient self-determination should guide decisions concerning
life-sustaining treatment); Marjorie M. Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New
Protected Interest, 9S YALE LJ. 219 (1985) (arguing that patient autonomy should be a legally
protected interest). To recover, however, the plaintiff must prove: that she was not fully informed
of all material or relevant risks; that she suffered some physical injury as a result; and, that if
adequately informed, a reasonable person would have decided differently. Thus, it may be
misleading to characterize the legal requirements of informed consent as grounded in patient
autonomy since recovery is based on the values of a "reasonable" person and not the individual
patient's personal values. See KEETON et al., supra note 97, § 32, at 191 (describing the general
rule that informed consent contains an objective component).
IS9. See Orentlicher, supra note 1SS, at 2102-03 (explaining that physicians' values still
predominate in medical decisions due to resistance by physicians who refuse to recognize patient
autonomy, especially when confronted with the possibility of medically undesirable treatment).
160. Id. at 2103.
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pregnant or to bear children. 161 Directive counseling, whether it occurs
in a public or a private nongovernmental setting, may create potential legal
problems under the ADA if, in counseling an HIV-infected woman to
forego motherhood, the provider bases her advice on nonmedical or
medically questionable factors.
HIV-related reproductive counseling designed to minimize perinatal
transmission of the virus is analogous to reproductive counseling for
genetic diseases. HIV infection is similar to a genetic disorder that can be
transmitted perinatally. Following this line of reasoning, HIV-related
reproductive counseling is similar to many types of genetic reproductive
counseling in that there is no medical cure for the infection and that the
fetus cannot be treated prior to birth. 162 Therefore, it can be argued that
HIV-related reproductive counseling should be treated in the same way as
reproductive counseling for genetic diseases that are not treatable prior to
birth. 163
Since directive genetic counseling is considered
164
directive reproductive counseling of HIV-infected
inappropriate,
women should be considered inappropriate. At a minimum, a counselor
should have to justify the discrepancy in counseling techniques.
Many proponents of directive HIV counseling may explain the
distinction between genetic counseling and HIV counseling by asserting that
HIV infection differs from genetic disorders because it entails not only the
chance of perinatal transmission but also the likelihood that the mother's
life expectancy will decrease. Therefore, some will argue, the mother's
decreased life expectancy is relevant enough to render the two situations
distinguishable. Although this argument may apply to most, but not all
genetic disorders, the decreased life expectancy of the mother generally is
not seen as a reason to direct, as opposed to advise, women not to become
pregnant. 165 Popular culture provides numerous instances where women

161. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
162. A child born with mY antibodies may not be infected with mY, and it may take up to
sixteen months before an accurate diagnosis can be made. Carol Levine & Ronald Bayer, The Ethics
of Screening for Early Intervention in HW Disease, 19 AM. J. PuB. HEALTH 1661, 1662 (1989).
163. Traditionally, routine prenatal genetic testing has not been performed for medical
conditions that cannot be treated prior to delivery and that can only be avoided by not becoming
pregnant or by aborting the fetus. See id. at 1664-65 (discussing the lack of justification for
mandatory mv screening because no therapeutic benefit will result).
164. See id. at 1666 (noting that genetic screening and counseling should not be undertaken
unless beneficial medical services can be provided); see also Levine & Dubler, supra note 22, at
346-48 (arguing that governmental involvement in the reproductive choices of women is wrong and
that a comprehensive approach involving education, access to health and prenatal care, and
improving services is what is really needed).
165. See Banks, supra note 31, at 374-75 (noting that there are several genetic disorders which
are fatal, yet there are no mandates for abortion for these disorders, and arguing that mY-infected
women should be treated the same as women with genetic disorders in terms of counseling on
reproductive options).
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with terminal or life-threatening illnesses have borne children and are
considered to be noble and self-sacrificing. For example, in the film Steel
Magnolias, a diabetic woman elects, against the advice of both her
physician and her mother, to become pregnant and subsequently dies while
her child is still a baby. 166 The daughter's action is portrayed as noble
and self-sacrificing because the child's birth ensures the continuation of the
bloodline of both the woman and her husband. Traditionally, childbearing
is viewed as a way to ensure one's immortality-a concern that may be
even more pressing for someone who knows that her life expectancy is
shortened. Since the impulse to procreate before dying is understood and
glorified, societal concern about the decreased life expectancy of HIVinfected mothers may have more to do with societal concerns that, because
of their socioeconomic and marital status, their offspring will become
burdens on the community.

2. Access to Medically Assisted Reproduction
Some women infected with HIV who want to become pregnant after
learning of their seropositive status will have infertility problems and will
need medically assisted reproductive services. 167
The CDC
168
recommendations imply that health care providers may advise HIVinfected women who want to become pregnant against seeking fertility
services and that reproductive services clinics may refuse to take HIVinfected women as patients. A refusal by a health care provider to provide
this type of medical service may pose an insurmountable barrier to
childbearing. Under the ADA, it is not clear whether health care providers
legally can refuse infertility services to all women infected with HIV
without some scientific basis for the decision.

a. Generally
Reproductive technology has advanced tremendously over the past
twenty years, providing women with fertility problems and the financial
166. STEEL MAGNOLIAS (Tri-Star Pictures 1989); see also Levine & Dubler, supra note 22,
at 323 (arguing that many women who have chronic, and even fatal diseases, choose to have children
and that "they are treasured by their families and admired by society for doing so").
167. See, e.g, J.R. Smith et al., Infertility Management in HN Positive Couples: A Dilemma,
302 BRIT. MED. J. 1447, 1450 (1991) (describing a case study of an lllV-positive couple who after
learning of their seropositive status and receiving pregnancy counseling, opted to continue with
infertility management). For example, African-American women are one and one-half times more
likely to have infertility problems than white women. Nsiah-Jefferson, supra note 44, at 49 (citing
a 1982 study by the National Center for Health Statistics). This is significant since most of the U.S.
women with AIDS are African-American or Hispanic. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
168. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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means with a vast variety of treatment options.169 Without addressing
the medical resource questions posed by some of the more expensive, and
less successful, medically assisted reproductive options, I am assuming for
the purposes of this discussion that money is not a problem for the HIVpositive woman requesting medically assisted reproductive services. Of
course, in reality, most of the women currently identified as infected with
HIV lack the financial resources to seriously consider using infertility
services.
Physicians who specialize in infertility problems have a tremendous
amount of control over women who want to bear children but who need
medical assistance. These physicians, often men, determine the availability
of infertility services for all women who seek them. Many physicians,
without much scientific evidence, counsel women with multiple sclerosis
and other disabilities not to have children "because it has seemed
'obvious'" that disabled people will not make good parents. 170
Most in vitro clinics are highly selective and often use factors like
socioeconomic and marital status to screen potential patients. 171 Some
commentators claim that reliance on these factors is the health care
provider's way of deciding who are "deserving and appropriate
parents. " 172 Often the decision by health care providers to deny fertility
treatment has little to do with medical considerations. Since questions
already exist about the propriety of disabled women bearing children or the
extent to which women with HIV deserve to become parents, 173 it is
reasonable to conclude that fertility services will be denied HIV-infected
women based on their seropositive status.
The general public tends to believe in the idealized notion of the
altruistic physician who makes objective medical decisions. This
mythological physician relies only on medical information and impartially
assesses the patient's medical condition in determining whether medically
assisted reproductive treatments are advisable. Anecdotal information,
however, suggests that, when physicians decide not to perform
reproductive services on some women, they fail to distinguish clearly
between the objective, medical factors and the nonmedical, value-laden,

169. See Melanie Howard, Feeling's Mutua/for Quint Moms, WASH. TIMEs, Nov. 3, 1991,
at All (discussing major advances in fertility problem treatments).
170. Deborah Kaplan, Disability Rights Perspectives On Reproductive Technologies And Public
Policy, in REPRODUCTIVE LAws FOR THE 1990s, supra note 44, at 241, 241-42 (noting the lack of
medical research on the effects of pregnancy in disabled women).
171. See GENA COREA, THE MOTHER MACHINE: REPRODUCTIVE TEcHNOLOGIES FROM
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION TO ARTIFICIAL WOMBS 145 (1985) (discussing the lack of access by poor
and minority women to new reproductive technologies).
172. !d. (quoting a Norfolk, Virginia, fertility clinic physician).
173. See supra Part ll.B.
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and personal factors they use to make their decisions. 174 Physicians'
attitudes toward women who want to become parents seem to be influenced
by societal preconceptions about motherhood.
b. Infertility Services for HIV-Infected Women

Whether a health care provider can refuse to assist a woman with HIV
who has fertility problems and wants to bear a child would constitute a
difficult case under the ADA. Although it may not violate the
Constitution's protection of the right to bear children,175 denying fertility
services may violate the ADA unless the health care provider can
affirmatively demonstrate either that the HIV-infected woman does not
meet legitimate eligibility criteria176 or that the woman poses a direct
threat to the health or safety of others. 177 Whether either of these
factors exists in any given situation may not be an easy determination.
Nonetheless, a blanket policy against providing infertility services to HIVinfected women would be suspect since, under the ADA, individual
assessment is required in each case. 178 To justify any blanket exclusion,
the provider of infertility services would have to demonstrate affirmatively
that there were accepted scientific reasons why all financially able women
with HIV do not meet eligibility requirements. '
Under the public accommodation section of the ADA, 179 a problem
arises in trying to distinguish between lawful and unlawful refusals to treat
where the health care provider determines that the disabled person is not
"qualified" for the requested services. The issue of refusing infertility
services to HIV-infected women is an example. I personally know of a
health care provider who regularly treats women with HIV and who
provides other women with infertility services, but who has refused, on at
least two occasions, to provide infertility services to HIV-infected women
who ·requested them. When questioned, the provider initially responded
174. See Goslin, supra note 5, at 251 (arguing that it is often difficult to distinguish between
judgments made because of medical expertise and those made because ofprejudice or irrational fear).
175. See supra notes 61-75 and accompanying text.
176. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(i) (Supp. ill 1991) (noting that discrimination includes
"the imposition ••• of eligibility criteria that screen out ••• an individual with a disability ••• ,
unless such criteria can be shown to be necessary for the provision of the goods [or] services •••
being offered"). Providers may also avoid a finding of discrimination if they show that a
modification of policies, practices, or procedures would fundamentally alter the nature of the
services. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (Supp. lli 1991).
177. 42 U.S.C. § 12182(b)(3) (Supp. m 1991); see supra notes 132-135 and accompanying
text.
178. See, e.g., Anderson v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 794 F. Supp. 342, 342 (D. Ariz.
1992) (questioning whether a blanket policy of prohibiting wheelchairs on the playing field is
permissible because the ADA requires an individual assessment of the risks).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 12181-12189 (Supp. lli 1991); see supra notes 9·14 and accompanying text.
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that, in her medical judgment, women with HN were inappropriate
candidates for infertility services. When pressed further to clarify the basis
for her conclusion, she admitted that, in her "professional" opinion,
women with HIV should not have children because of the burden rearing
children places on a person with a chronic and almost certainly fatal
disease. Nevertheless, she could cite no purely scientific reason for a
blanket exclusion of women based on their seropositive status.
The tendency of courts to defer to judgments by medical professionals
without a more probing inquiry is commonplace. HN is a complicated
disease, and infertility technology is an ever-changing, complex field. Both
facts raise legal, ethical, social, and economic issues that can only help
influence those medical providers of infertility treatment. Given the strong
feelings, both inside and outside the medical community, about the
propriety of HIV-infected women bearing children, discrimination almost
certainly will occur in this area absent some judicial or legislative action.
As mentioned previously, the courts seem unlikely to provide strong
protection of individual patient autonomy in the area of infertility
treatment.
V. Recommendations
Although one can argue reasonably that the ADA, as currently written,
should be construed to protect the reproductive rights of women with
disabilities, there is no guarantee that the courts will interpret the statute
that expansively. In recent years, the Supreme Court has been unwilling
to interpret federal antidiscrimination statutes broadly. For example, Title
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 prohibits sex discrimination in
any federally funded education "program or activity." 180 The Supreme
Court in Grove City College v. Bell held that the phrase "program or
activity" could not be read so broadly as to prohibit discrimination
throughout a college if the only federal money reaching the institution came
through the school's participation in a federal student financial- aid
program. 181 Many thought that this interpretation was contrary to the
intent of Congress, and in 1988 Congress confirmed this belief by enacting
legislation overriding the Court's decision in Grove City. 182 However,
during the intervening four years between Grove City and the corrective
legislation, dozens of alleged instances of sex discrimination in federally

ISO. Education Amendments of 1972, Tit. IX, § 901(a), 20 U.S.C. § 168l{a) (1988).
.
181. 465 U.S. SSS, 574-75 (1984).
182. See 20 U.S.C. § 1687(2)(A) (1988) (providing for a broad interpretation of "program or
activity" that includes all operations of an institution and prohibits discrimination if any one of these
receives federal financial assistance).
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funded education programs were beyond the power of the federal
government to prohibit. 183 In numerous other instances, .the Court has
interpreted other federal antidiscrimination statutes narrowly and arguably
inconsistently with congressional intent. 184
Nothing in the legislative history of the ADA clearly indicates an
intent to protect reproductive freedom. However, even if the legislative
history on this point were clear, judicial protection of reproductive
autonomy would not be guaranteed. Some members of the current
Supreme Court, notably Justice Antonin Scalia, openly disregard
legislative intent, relying instead on the plain meaning of the statute
whenever an interpretative question arises. 185 Therefore, a clear textual
183. In the wake of the Grove City decision, the investigation and litigation of a number of sex
discrimination complaints halted. S. REP. No. 64, tOOth Cong., 1st Sess. 11-16 (1988) (describing
the cutbacks in administrative enforcement as well as the adoption by lower federal courts of a
restrictive interpretation of "program and activity" in Title IX, Title VI, and the Age Discrimination
Act cases as a result of the Grove City decision). Undoubtedly, many more otherwise valid claims
were never filed.
184. See, e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 112 S. Ct. 820 (1992). In Presley, the
Supreme Court rejected the claim of African-American petitioners that the Voting Rights Act of
1965, as amended, covered post-election changes in the duties oflocal elected officials and that those
changes were subject to the Act's preclearance requirement. Id. at 832. In his dissent, Justice
Stevens objected to the majority's narrow construction of the statutory language, arguing that it was
inconsistent with the legislative history of the original 1965 Act and the 1970 and 1982 extensions
of the Act. Id. at 837 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Subsequently, Congress, in the 102d session, held
hearings on legislation designed to overrule Presley. See Voting Rights Act: BUingual Election
Materials, Expert Witness Fees, and Presley: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and
Constitutional Rights ofthe House Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (gathering
testimony on whether to extend § 203 of the Voting Rights Act for an additional fifteen years and
whether changes in the text of § 203 are necessary in light of the alleged need for broader language
assistance programs and recent court cases such as Presley). In 1993, the House introduced another
bill to amend the Voting Rights Act of 1965. H.R. 174, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). The bill,
which would be known as the Voting Rights Extension Act of 1993, attempts to clarifY some of the
definitions of the 1965 Act. The bill clarifies that "the term 'procedure with respect to voting'
includes any change of procedural rules, voting practices, or transfers of decision making authority
that affect the powers of an elected official or position." /d. The Subcommittee on Civil and
Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on H.R. 174 on March
18, 1993.
In Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court held that the phrase, "make and enforce
contracts," contained in 42 U.S.C. § 1981, referred only to discrimination in the formation of
contracts and not to contract performance. 109 S. Ct. 2363, 2376-77 (1989). Prior to this decision,
every federal appellate court had held that§ 1981 applied to discrimination in the performance of
contracts. H.R. REP. No. 40, 102d Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 90 (1991) (describing how Patterson
undermined the previous consensus of the federal courts of appeals in interpreting the Civil Righlll
Act). After Patterson, the federal courts dismissed hundreds of section 1981 race discrimination
claims. !d. at 91. Congress subsequently enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which had the effect
of overriding Patterson. 42 U.S.C. § 1981(b) (Supp. Ill 1991). For a more complete discussion
of these points, see Muriel Morisey Spense, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Stmggfe, So.
CAL. L. REv. (forthcoming) (describing the debate over the use of legislative intent in interpreting
ambiguous statutory provisions).
185. See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
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statement on reproductive autonomy is needed.
I propose that the ADA be amended to prohibit disability-based
discrimination in reproductive matters. An antidiscrimination provision
covering reproductive matters seems especially appropriate given the strong
evidence that both public and medical sentiment tends to disapprove of
individuals with disabilities, especially women, who affirmatively exercise
their right to procreate. The proposed amendment would not preclude
health care providers from fuiiy informing individuals with disabilities
about the medical consequences of pregnancy (for women); the demands
of rearing children (for women and men); and, where applicable, the
likelihood of transmission of any parental trait or disorder to potential
offspring. The proposed amendment, however, would make it less likely
that courts could uphold blanket policies limiting reproductive options and
order involuntary sterilization or medical interventions for women with
disabling conditions.
VI. Conclusion
There are compelling policy reasons for insuring that women infected
with HIV have access to medical treatment and appropriate counseling that
respects their autonomy in reproductive decision making. Policies
developed to address reproductive choices of HIV-infected women should
encourage independent and informed decision making by each woman and
should be based on current medical knowledge. This approach is the one
favored by the ADA. Absent strong congressional language, however, it
is uncertain whether this objective will be realized for vast numbers of
women infected with HIV. There are too many people in the medical
community and society in general who favor coercive policies that would
discourage reproduction based solely on a woman's antibody status. Given
the Supreme Court's reluctance in recent cases to interpret broadly
congressional antidiscrimination statutes, an amendment to the ADA is
needed. This amendment should affirmatively state that discrimination in
reproductive matters against individuals with disabilities is unlawful. Such
concurring in the judgment) (contending that, in construing the meaning of specific words in a
statute, deference should be given to the meaning that most closely approximates the ordinary usage
of the word end not to a particular meaning understood by only a few); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482
U.S. 578, 610-11 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (supporting Louisiana's Balanced Treatment for
Creation-Science & Evolution-Science Act as constitutional on its face end refusing to speculate on
the possible unconstitutional motives behind the passage of the Act); WilliamJ. Popkin,An 'Internal'
Critique of Justice Scalia's Theory of Statutory lntetpretation, 76 MINN. L. REv. 1133 (1992)
(critiquing Scalia's text- end rule-based approach to statutory interpretation); Note, Justice Scalia's
Use of Sources in Statutory and Constitutional lntetpretation: How Congress Always Loses, 1990
DUKE LJ. 160 (examining Scalia's textualist approach in interpreting statutes end his originalist
approach in interpreting the Constitution).
HeinOnline -- 3 Tex. J. Women & L.

97 1994

98

Texas Journal of Women and the Law

[Vol. 3:57

an amendment is the only way to guarantee reproductive autonomy for
individuals with disabilities.
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